



## **Research Report**

# **An Analytical Study of Ideally Inherent Operative Transformations of the Original Mental Process in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology**

by

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**Research Project Funded by  
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เรื่อง

ศึกษาวิเคราะห์การแปลงสภาพความคิดภายในกระบวนการทางจิตดั้งเดิมใน  
ปรากฏการณ์วิทยาของเอดมุนด์ ฮูสเซิร์ล

# **An Analytical Study of Ideally Inherent Operative Transformations of the Original Mental Process in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology**

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ชื่อรายงานการวิจัย:	ศึกษาวิเคราะห์การแปลงสภาพความคิดภายในกระบวนการทางจิตดั้งเดิม ในปรากฏการณ์วิทยาของเอดมุนด์ ฮุสเซอร์ล
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### บทคัดย่อ

งานวิจัยนี้เป็นงานวิจัยเชิงเอกสารมีเป้าหมาย ๓ ประการคือ ๑) ศึกษาองค์ประกอบที่สำคัญของการแปลงสภาพความคิดภายในกระบวนการทางจิตดั้งเดิมในปรากฏการณ์วิทยาของเอดมุนด์ ฮุสเซอร์ล ๒) ศึกษากระบวนการปฏิบัติการการแปลงสภาพความคิดภายในกระบวนการทางจิตดั้งเดิม ๓) วิเคราะห์การแปลงสภาพความคิดภายในกระบวนการทางจิตดั้งเดิมรูปแบบต่าง ๆ และปัญหาที่เกิดขึ้น

ผลของการวิจัยนี้ได้แสดงให้เห็นว่า การแปลงสภาพความคิดภายในกระบวนการทางจิตดั้งเดิมในปรากฏการณ์วิทยาของเอดมุนด์ ฮุสเซอร์ล นี่เป็นกระบวนการผลิตทางกระบวนการทางจิตโดยผ่านกระบวนการเปลี่ยนแปลงซึ่งมีเป้าหมายที่สำคัญคือ รวบรวมผลที่เกิดจากการแปลงสภาพหลากหลายรูปแบบโดยที่แต่ละรูปแบบของผลที่ได้นั้นเชื่อมต่อกันเพื่อรวมทั้งหมดไว้ภายใต้กระแสจิตอันเดียวของอีโก้บริสุทธิ์ (Pure Ego) การแปลงสภาพความคิดของกระบวนการทางจิตดั้งเดิมนั้นมีองค์ประกอบที่สำคัญอยู่ ๔ อย่างคือ ๑) การให้ข้อมูลเบื้องต้น (เนื้อหาประสาทสัมผัสส่วนที่สำคัญภายในจิต เช่น เนื้อหาประสาทสัมผัสในการมองที่ใช้เป็นข้อมูลทางประสาทสัมผัสด้านการมอง ข้อมูลนี้ได้ส่งต่อมาจากวัตถุที่รับรู้จากภายนอก ๒) ห้วงเวลาที่จิตรวมกันเป็นกระแสจิตอันเดียว ๓) ขอบเขตระยะเวลาของกระบวนการทางจิต เช่น ขอบเขตเวลาปัจจุบัน อดีต และอนาคต และ ๔) Pure Ego ที่ทำหน้าที่ในการสะท้อนต่อสิ่งที่อยู่ภายในจิตออกมา การแปลงสภาพดังกล่าวจะเห็นผลได้ขึ้นอยู่กับ ๓ ขั้นตอน คือ

ขั้นตอนแรกคือการรับรู้วัตถุทางประสาทสัมผัสภายนอก วัตถุที่รับรู้แล้วถูกเก็บไว้ในความจำเพื่อใช้เป็นข้อมูลสำหรับกระบวนการทางจิต ขั้นตอนที่สองเป็นขั้นตอนที่สืบเนื่องมาจากขั้นตอนแรกเรียกว่าขั้นตอนการจดจำซึ่งเป็นการจดจำระยะแรก กระบวนการระยะนี้เป็นระยะแรกของการแปลงสภาพของกระบวนการทางจิตดั้งเดิม โดยใช้วัตถุที่อยู่ในใจนั้นเป็นจุดเริ่มต้น และระยะที่สามเป็นขั้นตอนของการระลึกหรือเป็นการจำครั้งที่สอง ซึ่งเป็นการระลึกสิ่งที่ได้จดจำหรือสิ่งที่เป็น

ตัวแทนเพื่อสร้างการรับรู้ขึ้นมาใหม่ หลังจากกระบวนการทั้งหมดสิ้นสุดลงอย่างสมบูรณ์แล้ว สิ่ง  
ที่จดจำหรือสิ่งที่ใช้เป็นตัวแทนจะถูกผลิตขึ้นมาใหม่

อย่างไรก็ตามการผลิตสิ่งที่จดจำหรือสิ่งที่เป็ตัวแทนขึ้นมาใหม่เป็นไปได้สองทางคือ  
ข้อมูลทีผลิตขึ้นมาใหม่นั้นคลุมเครือ เพราะไม่พิจารณาสิ่งที่ผลิตขึ้นมาใหม่อย่างถึถ้วนโดยรับตัดสินใน  
สิ่งที่ถูกผลิตขึ้นมาใหม่ อีกทางหนึ่งคือการพิจารณาสิ่งที่ถูกผลิตขึ้นมาใหม่อย่างรอบครอบนำไปสู่การ  
รับรู้ใหม่ต่อไป



**Research Title:** An Analytical Study of Ideally Inherent Operative Transformations of the Original Mental Process in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology

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### ABSTRACT

This research is documentary research with three objectives: 1) to study of main factors of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process regarding Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology, 2) to study of the operative system of ideally inherent transformations of the original mental process, and 3) to analyze the ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process and its problems.

The result of this research is shown that the ideally inherent operation of transformations of the original mental process in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology is the process of reproduction of the mental process in which the mental process passed through the modificative process. The main aim of the operation is to connect all forms of the reproduction so as to unify all mental process under one stream of the mental process pertaining to a pure ego. The transformations are systematically operated with the main following aspects: (1) The mode of givenness (the immanent essence of a concrete sensation-content such as a visual sensation-content in the field of visual sensation-Data that is continually adumbrated from the visual physical objects), (2) the temporal mental processes are to be unified as one stream of mental

process, (3) the phase or the temporal horizon which is cosmic time in other ways such as horizon of Now, horizon of Before, and horizon of After, and (4) pure ego, the function of which is to direct its regards to the temporal modes of givenness (immanent essences). The transformative operation is effectively proceeded with three steps:

First is the step of a physical perception of the mental process in which the perceived physical thing is used as the essential content for all mental process as it is kept in a memory. The second step is succeeded from the first step which is called a retention, or the primary memory; the process of a modification using the immanent object kept in a retention as the initial part of the constitution of an identical object. Then, comes the third step. It is the step of a recollection or the second memory; it is to recall the remembered or represented for the perception again. After the whole process has fully accomplished, the remembered or represented is afresh reproduced.

However, the reproduction of the remembered or the represented can emerge with two possibilities; one is the vague-reproduced information as without repeating while looking at the reproduced flash; other is afresh one as it is repeated resulting in further perception.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The research work on “An Analytical Study of Ideally Inherent Operative Transformations of the Original Mental Process in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology” has successfully done with my great effort and also with generous help from various individuals and institutions. Without any support by them, I could not have accomplished this research. So, the acknowledgement is sincerely made to express my appreciate and gratitude to them.

Firstly, with a great pleasure, I would like to take this opportunity to express my deepest sense of gratitude to Venerable Phrasudhiratanapundit (Suthit Āpākaro), the Director of Buddhist Research Institute, MCU, including executives and staffs of the institute who are very kind and helpful to me for giving me essential suggestions for doing a research step by step.

Also, I would like to thank senior experts of the institute for their great suggestions for doing this research. With their suggestions, the research has successfully accomplished in accordance with the main objectives of the research as aimed.

Eventually, if any meritoriousness arises from my effort to do the research, may I contribute it to those who have given me a moral support to do a research and may all of them be prosperous, healthy and happy for ever.

Phramaha Somphong Khunakaro, Dr.

27 April 2020

## ABBREVIATION


In this research, the researcher has systematically made accuracy references from various sources of the data from where the primary and secondary materials are taken. The primary sources are taken from Edmund Husserl's main works such as his three books: *Ideas I-III* and other his additional books which are related to his main idea about Phenomenology, etc. used as the main texts for this research. The abbreviations of these texts are systematically set as follows:

The abbreviations refer to Edmund Husserl's texts are given from the English-translated editions, translated from German to English. The first form of their abbreviation being first quoted is the name of the book, then, followed by the number of the volume used by Roman number and then by page number respectively, for instances, **Ideas I**, p. 49., it refers a name of the text, **Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology**, First Book, with volume I and page number 49. Anyways, there are some single texts without volume; their abbreviations are put and followed by page numbers in a sudden, e.g., **PCIT.**, p. 23.; it refers a name of the text, **On Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time**, and followed by the page number, 23, etc.

- CM. : Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, tr. by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.
- Crisis. : The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, tr. by David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
- FTL. : Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. by Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.

- Ideas I. : Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, First Book, tr. by F. Kersten, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983.
- Ideas II. : Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, Second Book, tr. by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983.
- Ideas III. : Phenomenology and the Foundation of the Sciences Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Third Book, tr. by Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980.
- IP. : The Idea of Phenomenology, tr. by Lee Hardy, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1990.
- LI. I. : Logical Investigation, vol. I, tr. by J. N. Findlay (New York: Routledge, 2001.
- LI. II. : Logical Investigation, vol. II, tr. by J. N. Findlay New York: Routledge, 2001.
- ILTK. : Introduction of Logic and Theory of Knowledge, tr. By Claire Ortiz Hill, Dordrecht; Springer, 2008.
- PCIT. : On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, tr. John Barnett Brough, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1980.
- PICM. : Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, tr. by John B. Brough, The Netherlands: Springer, 2005.

- Phen. Psych. : Phenomenological Psychology, tr. by John Scanlon, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1925.
- PL. : The Paris Lectures, tr.&intr. by Peter Koestenbaum, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.
- SCM. : Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method, tr. By Ronald Bruzina Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- TSL. : Thing and Space, Lecture of 1907, tr. by Richard Rojcewicz, London: Springer Science Business Media. B.V., 1997.



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# **CHAPTER I**

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 The Significance and the Background of the Issue of Doing this Research**

The main factor of human beings consists of two sides; one is psyche and physic for the other, which might be called mind and body in other ways, it is conclusively called “human organ”. Comparatively, mind is certainly superior to body when functioning system of bodily organ is under control of mind; though, both of them corporately function in a knowing process. In the philosophical circumstances, western and eastern philosophers profoundly study how mind functions immanently. With this, most of them consensually come out with the same idea that mind cannot definitely function alone but together with the body. Also, when mind is to realize the object, it must inevitably rely on an object, which is immediately appearing to mind and motivates passive mind to be active in a sudden. Here is said to be the first moment of mind functioning of knowing the object; it might not be complicated when its factor of knowing the object in the initial moment as such can be able to explicitly apprehend. However, mind systematically functions which is to be enduring system by flowing under its stream constantly. Edmund Husserl, one of famous German philosophers, who is as the founder of Phenomenology, defined phenomenology as the essence of consciousness.<sup>1</sup> By this, he accepts whatever found in mental process as a genuine (reel) concrete

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<sup>1</sup> Devid Woodruff Smith, **Husserl**, (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 56.

part (*Stück*) which exists within the cogitation; meanwhile, he denies the physical things as not a genuine concrete part, for they are not as something which really exists within the cogitation.<sup>2</sup> Regardingly, he intensifies his developing philosophical idea by extremely realizing mind with its process and finding the essence that exists in mental process; it is so-called “immanent essence”. As Husserl accepts only the essence in mental process, not only mental process he works out, but the substantial factors which are working along with mental process in terms of stream flowing along together. Husserl calls this as ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process. It is mental process which immanently functions under its stream flowing with the *hyletic* data such as the data of data of color, data of tone, data of smell, data of pain, etc. Beside this, mental process functioning under the stream is constantly related to the time which is called inner time or phenomenological time.<sup>3</sup> Considerably, regarding the inner time, Husserl frankly indicates that all mental processes, which are unified within one stream of them, are involved in three horizons; that is, the horizon of Now, the horizon of Before and the horizon of After.<sup>4</sup> All these are substantial factors of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process; it is the mental process operating in reproducing new information.

Regarding the process of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process, initially, Husserl discloses the essential manner of mental process which plays the vital roles for operative transformations; that is, the process of reflective act of mind and modification of mind; both are to

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<sup>2</sup> Edmund Husserl, **Idea of Phenomenology**, tr. by L. Hardy, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), p. 27.

<sup>3</sup>Husserl, **Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology**, First Book, tr. by F. Kersten, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p. 192.

<sup>4</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 195.

cooperate if the process of the transformations has successfully done as Husserl says, “In this connection, first of all, one must take it clear that reflection of any kind has the characteristic of being a modification of consciousness and, moreover, a modification which essentially any consciousness can undergo.”<sup>5</sup> As for the process of reflective act of mind, it is said to be the initially operative process of mind functioning transformations as it can included all mode of the seizing upon the essence of something immanent and also of experiencing something immanent. Then, mental process modifies whatever reflected immanently. To be precisely in terms of the operative transformations of the mental process, according to Husserl, what we have to investigate are a modification of mental process under the heading of the reflection and a totality of essential modifications which any mental process must undergo during its original course together with different forms of reproductions.<sup>6</sup> With this, in the process of modification, Husserl indicates that it leads back to primary mental process which perceived the physical things which are still kept in retention. Then, as very mental process is a flux of becoming, it gets whatever perceived and retained in original mental process in continuous flowing with protentions mediated by a flowing phase of originality.<sup>7</sup> This establishes the different kinds of variations which mental process operates and results in different forms of reproductions such as recollection, representation, etc. By the issue of mental process operating an inherent transformation of its original mental process as mentioned, regarding the researcher’s opinion, it should make a research of this point of views so as to clearly apprehend the way of all mental process being transformed by the process of modifications resulting in various forms of reproductions.

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<sup>5</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 178.

<sup>6</sup> *See Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

## **1.2 The objective of the Research**

1.2.1 To study of Main factors of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process regarding Western philosophical thought, Edmund Husserl,

1.2.2 To study of the operative system of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process,

1.2.3 To analyze of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process and a problem of the transformation.

## **1.3 Statement of the Problems Desired to Know**

This research starts with delineating to researchable problems to be discussed as follows:

1.3.1 What is the factors of mental process? And how is the mental process of reflection and modification directed towards the intended objects regarding Western philosophical thought, Edmund Husserl.

1.3.2 How is the operative system of the original mental process functioning the transformations?

1.3.3 How is various forms of transformations of the original mental process reproduced? And how is the problem of the transformations?

## **1.4 The scope of this Research**

This research is documentary analysis of Edmund Husserl's thought of the mental process that operating ideally inherent transformations of original mental process thereby modifying the physical things perceived and kept in the mental process resulting various forms of reproductions. By this analysis, it will be deeply made through interpretations, examinations, and investigations from the materials found in the primary and secondary sources.

By the primary sources, the researcher takes an interpretation from main works of Edmund Husserl on phenomenology such as these books: (1) *Ideas I: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, (2) *Ideas II: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, (3) *Ideas III: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Phenomenology and the Foundation of the Sciences*, (4) *The Idea of Phenomenology*, and including his book on *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, etc.; all of these books are essentially available in both translational and original additions. The information from such these works is taken for analyses and interpretations so as to get an accuracy thought of him.

By the secondary source and other works related to the research, the researcher takes the works from other scholars whether from Western or Easten philosophers in the field of phenomenology and the subject relavent to the topic of the research; then, they are analyzed, criticized and also interpreted including comparting with each other so as to get the accuracy information in accordance with Husserl's thought of the operative transformation of the original mental process.

## **1.5 Definition of the Terms Used in the Research**

The Research contains technical terminologies relevant to study the operative transformations of original mental process in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology. So, it might lead to misunderstand or hardly understand the main concept of this study. So, to prevent from such this problem, the definitions of the technical terms are given as follows:

1.5.1 **Transformation** means a complete change in the appearance or character of something or someone, especially so that a thing or person is improved.

1.5.2 **Mind** means the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought.


1.5.3 **Mental Process** means an active mind getting the function when it is directed toward something outside and turns to be conscious of the thing. Thus, according to Husserl, mental process is consciousness of something; for example, a fantasizing is fantasizing of the determinate centaur.

1.5.4 **Phenomenology** means a method of describing the nature of our perceptual contact with the world. Phenomenology is concerned with providing a direct description of human experience. Edmund Husserl is said to be the father of phenomenology as he established this phenomenology, whose purpose is to find the validity of knowledge.

1.5.5 **Original Mental Process** means the mental process functioning to percept the outward objects before being directed to mind.

## 1.6 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of this research is systematically drafted with essential concept in terms of the process, the way of doing a research including its result as follows:



Regarding the conceptual frame work, it can give the step by step of the research doing as follows:

1. First step is to construct the outline and also the problem as its background of the research and also the significance of the points that be made discussion in the research

2. The second step is to collect the data from the primary sources of Edmund Husserl's texts of Phenomenology. Then, the secondary sources are critically used such as the text books relevant to the works in the research, research works, journals, the data available on online and so on.

3. The third step is to study of the mind, mental process and its contents in which all of them are used as the primary information for transformative operation. By this step, it is studied separately: Mental process has its essential factors such as ego, consciousness, intentionality and reflection and inner time. And other essential aspects for the transformative operations are the mental contents such as external and immanent contents; all of these contents are usefully used as the information for the transformative operation.

4. The fourth step is to work out the way to transformative operations thereby starting at original mental process which functions as perceiving the physical contents as the primary content for the transformations and active system of transformations of the original mental process such as retention, modification, recollection and reproduction respectively.

5. The fifth step which is the last one of the research process that is analysis the ideally inherent operation of the transformations of the original mental process and conclusion together with giving some suggestions for further doing a research.

## 1.7 Reviews the Relevant Literature and Information

The researcher has reviewed the literatures, information together with research works which are related to the studying issues as follows:

**1.7.1 Joe Dispenza, D.C.**<sup>8</sup> has clearly disclosed the mind which modified resulting in knowing what we have never known before. By this, he uses two laws: the law of association by learning new concepts and couple with it with the law of repletion so as to know what we do not know. According to him, for developing new concepts in our mind, learning new information, having new experiences, repeating the same experiences, or practicing a skill, we have to associate with what we know in order to understand what we do not know, and then repeating the thought process again and again that will cause neurons to pattern together as a neural community. The end product of this activity is a new neural network.

**1.7.2 Roberto Walton, Shigeru Taguchi and Roberto Rubio**<sup>9</sup> have reasonably criticized the perceptual process in Husserl's phenomenology thereby giving a phenomenological description of perception thereby giving essential information of the object or a part of consciousness which is certainly regarded as one of main factor of perception and consciousness with four essential different functions of objects and consciousness:

1.1 The objects of perception can be regarded as making up or constituting, some part of consciousness.

1.2. The objects of perception are identical between subjects. They are, typically, accessible to anyone perceptually comparable.

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<sup>8</sup> Joe Dispenza, D.C. **Evolve Your Brain: The Science of Changing Your mind**, Florida: Health Communication Inns, 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Roberto Walton, Shigeru Taguchi, and Roberto Rubio, **Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl's Phenomenology**, Cham: Springer, 2017.

1.3 The objects of perception are physical. As physical objects, they take up a common spacetime shared by all actual objects, including the perceivers. It is this common, intersubjective spacetime that explains the public accessibility of perceptual objects.

1.4 Consciousness is intrinsically mental or psychological. It's the introspectively accessible and private content of the subject's mind. Consciousness is obviously "in the head" in some metaphysically determinative sense.

**1.7.3 Jittiwat Narakornpaichit<sup>10</sup>** has conducted a research entitle on "Consciousness Eliminated in Daniel Dennett". Regarding the research, it can be apprehensively concluded that the evolution of human's consciousness, regarding Denett's proposal, can be divided into two main stages. The first stage explains how natural selection shapes up the brain into the suitable hardware. The second stage theorizes how memo selection develops in human's brain and becomes the effective software.

On the first stages, it is the most important stage as it is a change from hardwired to plastic mechanism in brain's evolution. Although hardwired ability is light weight and energy-efficient, it is not adjustable to fluctuated environment and requires a lot of time for each alteration. In this respect, hardwired strategy is only good for simple organisms with fast reproduction cycles such as bacteria, worm, and bug. In more complex organisms, on the contrary, depending on hardwired mechanism is not the best survival strategy. For example, a bird that can eat only berries will be extinct when there are no more berries left in its habitat. While a bird that can adjust to eat other fruits will survive and reproduce. Natural selection, thus, unconsciously and

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<sup>10</sup> Jittiwat Narakornpaichit, *Consciousness Eliminated in Daniel Dennett*, **M.A. Thesis**, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, 2018.

unintentionally drives animals' brains towards more flexible mechanism so animals can partly adjust themselves to certain conditions they encounter. In other words, they can learn new abilities on top of the hardwired skills in order to live in new niches. This is called brain-plasticity; but it comes with high cost. The flexible brain requires more time to develop and is energy-consumed. Consequently, the ration between hardwired and plastic mechanism is different in each organism depending on its fittest niches.

On the second stage, Dennett proposes that the software that runs on our brain is unconsciously and unintentionally evolved by memo selection. Memo is defined as behaviors or ideas that can be copied and transmitted within cultures. If gene is a backbone of natural selection, memo is a backbone of cultural selection. It spreads conceptually, not genetically, as information from person to person. Memo selection speeds up human's learning processes and improves our abilities to adapt in a matter of seconds instead of generations.

**1.7.4 Narada Thera<sup>11</sup>** has explained the modified process of mental process that it is the succession of thought process in which each thought moment consists of three minor instants (*khaṇas*). They are arising or genesis (*uppāda*), static or development (*ṭhiti*), and cessation or dissolution (*bhaṅga*). Each thought moment successes to each other; it is to say that cessation of one thought moment results in the genesis of other thought-moment. By this, before perishing, it transmits its potentialities to its successor; it is called the continuous flow of consciousness like a stream without interruption. When the object is presented to consciousness through any of the doors, then, the corresponding thought-process runs uninterruptedly for 16 thought-moments.

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<sup>11</sup> Nārada Mahā Thera, **A Manual of Abhidhamma**, Kaula Lumpur: The Buddhist Missionary Society, 1956.

In this point of views, it discloses the operating way of consciousness with its object flowing under a stream of such consciousness.

**1.7.5 Ignacy S. Friut<sup>12</sup>** indicates consciousness or mental process as the results of a long-lasting evolutionary process connected with the adaptation of human beings to their natural and social environments as he said, “Mind and consciousness are the structures of spiritual being, which originated emergently and therefore are relatively autonomous in their existence; incessantly, they open up human subjects for the changing natural and social environments, which are to be learnt. A vital role in opening, internal constituting and the evolution of mind and consciousness is played by language itself an evolutionarily generated means of communication. Beside the informative function, which is the youngest function of mind and consciousness, language performs some other, evolutionarily older functions – the phatic (social) and persuasive ones. These serve the purposes of direct adaptation to social life and more indirect adaptation to the changing natural environment, which underlies the existence of society. And an essential prerequisite for such a view of consciousness and the functioning of human mind is the phenomenological analysis of man’s direct experiences, which require adequate forms of rationality that would enable people to understand, communicate and co-operate with one another.

**1.7.6 Victor L. Schermer<sup>13</sup>** explained that “Where id was, there ego shall be” (the structural model.) Within the ego and super-ego, there are changes in defense mechanisms as well as in self-and object-representations that allow for a greater degree of self-tolerance and acceptance of reality. As

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<sup>12</sup> Ignacy s. Fiut, **Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research**, The Netherlands: Springer, 2007.

<sup>13</sup> Victor L Schermer, **Meaning, Mind, and Self-Transformation: Psychoanalytic Interpretation and the Interpretation of Psychoanalysis**, London: Karnac Books Ltd, 2014.

these representations reorganize, psychological development moves forward, and a mature identity is formed. Identity governs the whole of the personality, its motivations, its interests, and its values, so that identity formation is indeed a transformation at a profound level.

**1.7.7 Carmelo Cali<sup>14</sup>** gives an important information about the process of perception by giving the concept of phenomenology as it is some part of perception that Phenomenology aims at accounting for perception according to the meaning that it displays to subjects in naive experience by means of an autonomous theoretical structure. In addition, he explains the main factor of perception that is its properties.

According to him, perceptual properties are a subset of properties in general. They are the effects of forces that the physical bodies exert on our nervous systems. Perceptual properties are not featuring of things, nor do they denote their qualities, rather they are sensory effects that the bodies induce on the sensory organs by means of those physical forces that trigger the physiological mechanisms underlying perception. The properties that are ascribed to things, for example color, touch, taste, smell, cold or warmth, and sounds, are in reality the manifestation of the interaction between the bodies in the physical world and the sensory organs.

**1.7.8 M. Merleau-Ponty<sup>15</sup>** disclosed the concept of perception through phenomenology thereby giving essential information about the phenomenology of perception by defying first phenomenology as study of essences, including the essence of perception and of consciousness. He also says, however, that phenomenology is a method of describing the nature of our

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<sup>14</sup> Carmelo Cali, **Phenomenology of Perception: Theories and Experimental Evidence**, Boston: Brill-Rodopi, 2017.

<sup>15</sup> M. Merleau-Ponty, **Phenomenology of Perception**, tr. by Colin Smith, Great Britain: Routledge&Kegan Paul Ltd, 1962.

perceptual contact with the world. Phenomenology is concerned with providing a direct description of human experience. As for perception, according to him, the background of experience which guides every conscious action. The world is a field for perception, and human consciousness assigns meaning to the world. We cannot separate ourselves from our perceptions of the world. Perception may be structured by associative forces, and may be focused by attention. Attention itself does not create any perceptions, but may be directed toward any aspect of a perceptual field. Attention can enable conscious perceptions to be structured by reflecting upon them.

**1.7.9 Peter Machamer and J.E. McGuire<sup>16</sup>** discloses the concept of perception regarding Descartes that Descartes lays out a version of his theory of perception in schematic form by distinguishing three grades of sensation:

To get a clear view of what sort of certainty attached to the senses, we must distinguish three grades of sensory response.

The first is limited to the immediate stimulation (immediate afficetur) of the bodily organs by external objects; this can consist in nothing but the motion of particles of the organs, and any change of shape and position resulting from this motion.

The second grade comprises all the immediate effects (immediate result) produced in the mind as a result of being united with a bodily organ which is affected in this way. Such effects include the perceptions of pain, pleasure, thirst, hunger, colors, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold and the like, which arise from the union and as it were the intermingling of mind and body, as explained in *the Sixth Meditation*.

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<sup>16</sup> Peter Machamer and J.E. McGuire, **Descartes's Changing Mind**, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009.

The third grade includes all the judgments about things outside us which we have been accustomed to make from our earliest years-judgments occasioned by the movements of these bodily organs.

**1.7.10 David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre<sup>17</sup>** explain mind in the terms of “act” thereby supporting Husserl’s idea on mental phenomenon. By this, he mentions such this in the book, *Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language*, that we shall adopt of the terminology that Husserl refers to mental phenomenon that are intentional as acts of consciousness or, more simply, acts. Moreover, according to him, there are many different kinds or species, or acts (as Husserl says, acts with different “thetic characters): perceiving, judging, imagining, hoping, and so on. Moreover, he follows with Husserl’s thought that an act of consciousness must have the intended object which is called the object of consciousness or the object of the act of consciousness.

**1.7.11 Peter Godfrey-Smith<sup>18</sup>** gives other opinion of mind that is the place of mind in nature thereby finding its characteristic role in the nature. By this, he classifies the role of mind into two concepts of function in his book, *Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature*, as follows:

1) The teleonomic sense of function: It is the term sometimes used by biologists to refer, roughly, to those parts of traditional teleological thinking that can be given a foundation in the operation of natural selection.

2) Cummins functions: It is the capacities or effects of components of systems, which are salient in the explanation of capacities of the larger system. The important feature of the concept of a Cummins functions is its

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<sup>17</sup> David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, **Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language**, Dordrecht: The Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1982.

<sup>18</sup> Peter Godfrey-Smith, **Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature**, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

undemanding nature. Cummins functions can exist wherever there is a system and project of explanation directed upon the capacities of the system.

**1.7.12 David J. Chalmers<sup>19</sup>** has given us reasonably two concepts of mind that separately classifies into phenomenon and psychological concept as mentioned in the book, *The Conscious Mind*. The first concept is about the phenomenon concept. It is the concept of mind as conscious experience, and of a mental state as a consciously experience mental state. The second concept is about the psychological concept of mind. This is the concept of mind as the causal or explanatory basis for behavior. According to psychological concept, it matters little whether a mental state has a conscious quality or not. What matters is the role it plays in a cognitive economy. On the phenomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it feels; on the psychological concept, mind is characterized by what it does.

**1.7.13 William Seager<sup>20</sup>** has considerably stressed two states of mind in his book, *Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment*. One state of mind is the intentional mental states and other is the non-intentional phenomenal mental states. By intentional mental state, it is the state of mind with representational state. By contrast, the non-intentional states have no representational contents, they are pure phenomenon.

**1.7.14 Jenny Wade<sup>21</sup>** gives an essential definition of consciousness or mental process with four basic essentials in the book, *Changes of Mind*, thus:

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<sup>19</sup> David J. Chalmers, **The Conscious Mind**, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

<sup>20</sup> William Seager, **Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment**, New York: Routledge, 1999.

<sup>21</sup> Jenny Wade, **Changes of Mind: A Holonomic Theory of the Evolution of Consciousness**, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996.

(1) Consciousness is the experience of being alive. It is inherent in living existence. For the majority of humans, the experience of being alive involves the ongoing and a priori sense of self as the agent who is aware. Subjective, self-reflective experience is believed to be different from the conscious mode of animals with the possible exception of some higher primates and other mammals, such as whales, dolphins, and elephants and completely lacking in inanimate objects. The 'is-ness' of awareness becomes an irreducible experience equated with living being, even in the absence of anything to be conscious of. The essence of is-ness has been the foundation of the mystical tradition, which equates individual awareness with a facet of Cosmic Consciousness.

(2) Consciousness concerns the intersection between private, "interior," "subjective" experience.

(3) Consciousness also concerns the "objective" or "outside" world.

(4) Memory is an integral part of conscious experience, binding the moment-to-moment sense of awareness into a coherent pattern that provides the sense of personal continuity, the ongoing sense of self.

## **1.8 Research Methodology**

With the exploration of this research “An Analytical Study of Ideally Inherent Operative Transformations of the Original Mental Process in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology”, the following two objectives are to purposely be examined, namely: 1) to study of main factors of ideally inherent operative transformations of original mental process regarding Western philosophical thought, Edmund Husserl, 2) To study of the operative system of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process, and 3) to analyze of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process and a problem of the transformation.

The research methodology can be presented in six areas, namely: (1) Format of the Research, (2) Materials and Relevant Texts (3) Research Tools, (4) Collection of Data, (5) Data Analysis, and (6) Summary of the Research Process. Each area of the research is given in details as follows:

### **1.8.1 Format of the Research**

This is a documentary research work. So, the methodology of the research has been established thereby employing the research materials and instrument, the purpose of which is to find out the novel knowledge thereby investigating deeply mind, main factors of mind and its process and transforming mind in higher level in the terms of reproduction. Here is the way to establish novel knowledge resulting in modern sciences regarding the western philosophical thought.

### **1.8.2 Research Tools**

The research tools enable the researcher to construct theories and system models, as well as managing with those data and information. The essential research tools employed in this work consist of the use of technological devices in data collection and analysis such as systematic analysis of related equipment so as to clearly criticize and reasonably explain in accordance with the process involved to the information and data employing for this research.

However, the research tools suitably chosen and employed for the types of research are as listed follows:

1. Personal computer,
2. Laptop,
3. The internet,
4. Photographs,
5. Camera,
6. Audio recordings,

7. Etc.

These tools are effective and important for conducting research throughout the research process from beginning to the end of process.

### **1.8.3 Collection of Data**

This research is a qualitative study using the qualitative method starting by collecting data from the primary source of Edmund Husserl's texts of phenomenology. Then, the secondary sources are critically used such as the text books relevant to the works in the research, research works, journals, the data available on online and on so. As Edmund Husserl is German philosopher, both sources are used partly in English and German languages. However, the process of collecting, synthesizing, and utilizing the data may be understood depending on the response to each objective in the following ways:

#### **1.8.3.1 Data Collection for Answering the First Objective**

The first objective of the research is to study of main factors of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process regarding Western philosophical thought, Edmund Husserl,

A study and the data collection of basic knowledge including the background of the concept and principle of ideally inherent operative transformation of the original mental process regarding Husserl's phenomenology are to apprehensively done in the research with the two topics: (1) Survey of the factors of mental process playing a main role for directing the outside and immanent data to mind such as intentionality and reflection including the appearance of the mental objects respectively; and (2) examination of the functioning process of mind in connection with the objects, both the objects outside mind and immanent data. The data in two topics mentioned above are utilized and applied from Edmund Husserl's phenomenology.

### **1.8.3.2 Data Collection for Answering the Second Objective**

The second objective of this research is to study of the operative system of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process.

A study of the way to operative system of the transformation of original mental process is to be done by data collection from both primary and secondary sources. Then, the ideas given by the data collection is analyzed as well in this step so as to deeply study the operative system of the transformation of the original mental process.

### **1.8.3.3 Data Collection for Answering the Third Objective**

The third objective of this research is to analyze the ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process and a problem of the transformation.

It is to analyze the various forms of the transformed reproduction and its problems. By this, the results from the second objective of the research are used for criticizing and analyzing process such as the data of various forms of the transformed reproduction including the problem thereof.

### **1.8.3.4 Data Analysis**

An analysis of the data from the primary and secondary sources including the knowledge relevant to the data from various philosophical scholars in the circumstances of epistemology and metaphysics used in the research is to show the series of knowledge and the process gained from the study from such these sources. Besides, data analysis is also performed thereby using qualitative analysis.

In addition to the data analysis, the data synthesis is also used to bring those results of analyzed data from various areas to be synthesized together. By this, it is to certainly focus on the important concept indicating mind with its

function leading to reasonable knowing act and ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process resulting in getting novel science as a consequence. All of these is basically gained thereby analyzing mainly the thought from phenomenology established by Edmund Husserl.

### **1.8.3.5 Summary of the Research Process<sup>22</sup>**

In conducting the Research, there are stages of the research process conducted altogether respectively. The following six steps outline a summary of steps in the whole research process:

#### **1) First Step: Outline Construction/Problem Discussion**

The first step is outline construction which signifies constructing the overall outline of the work in all related dimensions corresponding to the objectives. Then the problem discussion, among the researchers including the research adviser, is made by discussing the problems encountered according to the significance of the studies. As a result, at this preliminary stage, the first outcome depicts a draft version of the research work together with the research's tentative table of content.

#### **2) Second Step: Data Collection**

The second step is preparation of data to be used in the research by gathering all useful data and information. This step is mentioned in details earlier in the topic "Collection of Data"

#### **3) Third Step: Creation of Ground Knowledge**

Next, the third step represents the creation of ground knowledge of mind and mental process and its contents. This is to attempt in creating ground of knowledge of the main factors of operation of transformation of original

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<sup>22</sup> See Chart 1.6: The Research Process showing an overview of the entire process of how the research has been conducted.

mental process thereby utilizing the essential material from previous steps. By this, it creates the ground knowledge of two main points: one is the knowledge about mind and its process, other is mental objects.

#### 4) Fourth Step: Operation of Inherent Transformations

The fourth step deals mainly with the operation of inherent transformation of original mental process. By this, it is divided into two parts: one is about the beginning of an operation of the transformation the explanation about experiencing the external objects; other is about the operation of the transformations with four steps: Retention, Modification, Recollection, and Reproduction. The data used for this operation are brought from the ground level of knowledge obtained previously.

#### 5) Fifth Step: Analysis, Conclusion and Suggestions

Then, the fifth step is to analyze the whole process of transformation of mind, the transformed mental process, the result of what is transformed which called reproduction. Besides, it is to indicate the problem that the transformative process might fail.

#### 6) Sixth Step: Finalizing a Completed Version of the Research Project Report

Finally, the last step is to finalize a completed version of the research project report. This step is to identifying significant research findings; compilation of bodies of knowledge and insights, then formulate conclusions, as well as suggesting useful information for further research.


The final completed report entitled “An Analytical Study of Ideally Inherent Operative Transformations of the Original Mental Process in Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology” is finally developed and such body of knowledge is ready for its publication.

## **1.9 The Expected Succeed and Benefit of the Research**

1.9.1 To get knowledge of the main factors of the ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process regarding Western philosophical thought, Edmund Husserl,

1.9.2 To have a thorough knowledge of the system of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process,

1.9.3 To get knowledge of the way to approach a new essence of the thing through an analysis of the ideally inherent operative transformations of original mental process.



## **CHAPTER II**

# **MAIN FACTORS OF IDEALLY INHERENT OPERATIVE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL MENTAL PROCESS**

### **2.1 Introduction**

In the natural world, according to Husserl, the world comprises of two aspects: human beings and surrounding world; they are differentiated from each other in the terms of a position in the world of natural attitude.<sup>1</sup> Husserl calls the human being as a subject in the natural world; it is the subject who can perceive, cognize and give a meaning thing that results in differentiating from an object in the natural attitude. Comparing with the object in the natural world, the human being is most important as it is alone a being with psychic life thereby having a sensuous manner such as feeling, perceiving, experiencing etc. Husserl indicates a nature of the human being that contains two parts; one is the part of a living body and other with soul or psyche; both of them play a vital role for each other as mind which is without a body needs material things

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<sup>1</sup> As far as the natural attitude is concerned, Husserl divides two attitudes on the condition of different experiences: (1) the attitude focused upon nature, in this case experienced nature, upon mere things, or abstractly upon animals' bodies or cultural objects as mere things; (2) personalistic attitude: the attitude focused upon persons or upon human beings as persons. *See* Edmund Husserl, **The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy**, tr. by David Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 327.

(body) as its body to be animated<sup>2</sup> and to be expressed its activities in the sense of apperception of human being. In this point, Husserl makes it clear about the expression of mind through the living body as follows:

Indeed, he is, after all, the human being who knows himself to be in the world with living body and soul, which moves in space and worlds with his hands, as manual worker, or in some other way with his living body, who, in battle, also fights with his living body, is naturally always conscious of his living body, acting through it upon his external world or experiencing through it a touch, a push, a wound.<sup>3</sup>

The message as mentioned above indicates preliminary process of experiences that leads human being for perceiving the external world the main factors of which consist of mind, its process (consciousness or mental process) and mental objects. However, in Husserl's phenomenology, all these terms are instead expressed by Husserl in the triad "ego cogito cogitatum."<sup>4</sup> By this triad, according to him, in the constitutive process of experiences, he interprets ego as pure subjectivity which is said to be a central locus of all experiences emanating from conscious acts thereby coordinating with both cogito and cogitatum. Also, Husserl defines the term "cogito" as an act and terms "cogitatum" as the object of the act; the relation of them results in an act of perceiving something. In *Paris Lecture*, it reveals an intimate relation between the act (the cogito) and the object (the cogitatum) that the act synthesizes the

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<sup>2</sup> Husserl, **Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, Second Book**, trs. by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 1983. p. 129.

<sup>3</sup> **Crisis**, p. 322.

<sup>4</sup> These triadic terms "*ego cogito cogitatum*" are technically transformed from the Descartes' formula that is "*ego cogito*" in which he formulated this form as a fundamental epistemological act. See Edmund Husserl, **The Idea of Phenomenology**, tr. by Lee Hardy, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1990), p. xix.

object. By this point, the object is used as the intentional one for the act in the way that the object is meant or intended by the act, then, the act of apprehension constructs, fashions, constitutes the object in this regard. So, in this point, according to Husserl, every cogito contains a meaning that is its cogitatum (its object) that constitutes an experience; for example, the experience of a house, it is precisely the experience of this and only this house appearing on this or that way and has certain specific determinations when seen from the side, from nearby, and from afar.<sup>5</sup> Thereafter, it is the duty of ego taking position which is so called active ego, the function of which is to attend, consider, compare, distinguish, judge, etc.; it is to say that it is the ego in the proper sense.<sup>6</sup> By this, in general speaking, it is about mental process in perceiving its objects generating experiences. Here is said to be the primal process of the inherent transformative process of absolutely originary mind as it constantly uses perception of the physical thing for the originary mental process for such this mental transformations such as rememberings, presentation in phantasy and so on.<sup>7</sup> So, the inherent transformations of original mind operates with two main factors: one is an inward factor, the other is outward one. By the inward factor, it is a mental act with ego and consciousness for perceiving its object (cogito). With regard to the outward factor, it is the object of mind (cogitatum) in the cognitive act. To understand systematically such these transformations, it is necessarily to study profoundly both inward and outward factors together and uses such these factors as essential tools for the process and a result of such these transformations also.

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<sup>5</sup> Edmund Husserl, **The Paris Lectures**, tr.&intr. by Peter Koestenbaum, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), p. 12.

<sup>6</sup> **Ideas II.**, pp. 224-5.

<sup>7</sup> Husserl, **Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology**, First Book, tr. by F. Kersten, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), p. 179.

## 2.2 Mind and its Nature as Inward Factor

By mind and its nature, while contacting with some object outside, mind reveals itself in terms of mental activities as Husserl said that the psychic can be found in the world only in connection with bodies.<sup>8</sup> So, its appearance is outwardly expressed by feelings such as joy, pain, pleasure, displeasure, etc. and also the manners of functions such as thinking, considering, comparing, distinguishing, exercising, universalization and ideation, concluding, proving, etc. All these are sensuous feelings and mental activities expressed through a living body. Considerably, Husserl indicates the significant manner of mental functions that it instinctively strives for something or else actively set itself the goals and is directed toward it by desiring or willing.<sup>9</sup> By these sensuous feelings and the manner of mental functions, it reveals the main factors of mind including its activities.

### 2.2.1 Property of Mind

Psyche is the subject for the experiential world; therefore, it connects with the corporeal thing and the lived experience. By the corporal body, psyche is not related to it as the material thing primarily; there is only the lived experience being related to it mediately.<sup>10</sup> In order to be animated, on the other hand, psyche requires a material thing as his body as Husserl said, "...the psychic subject has a material thing as his Body because it is animated..."<sup>11</sup> Thus, having related to the lived experience mediately and had the material thing as its body, psyche functions further along with its properties, in which Husserl indicates that it manifests in the lived experiences as psychic modes of

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<sup>8</sup> **Ideas II.**, p. 229.

<sup>9</sup> Husserl, **Phenomenological Psychology**, tr. by John Scanlon, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1925), p. 79.

<sup>10</sup> **Ideas II.**, p. 129.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

behavior. Psychic properties therefore are “unities of manifestation”.<sup>12</sup> Hence, psychic properties include every personal property such as the intellectual character of man and a totality of his intellectual dispositions, his affective character, his practical character, every one of his spiritual capacities and aptitudes, his mathematical talent, his logical acumen, his magnanimity, amiability, self-abnegation, etc.<sup>13</sup> In addition to these psychic properties, there are other psychic properties that involve in its sense in accordance with Husserl’s word, “In addition, his senses and the dispositions of sense behavior which are properly his own, which are characteristic of him, his phantasy disposition, and so on, are psychic properties.”<sup>14</sup> Besides, Husserl indicates the relationship between psychic properties and these groups of an experience by the same way that material properties relate to the actual and possible schematic “appearance” in which it manifests or would manifest itself.<sup>15</sup> As a result, it is the way in which the respective properties would come to an intuitive givenness of their essence and being, i.e., to an actually exhibiting intuition and experience.

In addition, he explains about psyche as the unity of a streaming psychic life and the streaming-process in psyche as its state or act, which is subordinate the unique principle of the unity of stream as he said, “... every psychic life is the unity of a streaming psychic life, and what streams in it as a psychic state or act is subordinate to fully unique principles of this stream-unity.”<sup>16</sup>

Apart from the psychic life as unity of streaming life, there is other life in which new unities and habitualities are included in the psychic life; that

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<sup>12</sup> **Ideas II.**, p.129.

<sup>13</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>14</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>15</sup> **Ibid.**, pp. 120-30.

<sup>16</sup> **Phen. Psych.**, p. 107.

is, the passive and active abilities, abilities of perception, abilities of feeling, abilities of memory, intellectual abilities, etc.<sup>17</sup> As per these abilities, which are personal characteristics, they are variable, changeable, and unrestable totally; thus, unity of identical I, which belongs to psyche as well, is used as substratum for these abilities, as Husserl states thus:

With these constantly variable abilities we are already referred to the properly essential unity belonging to every psyche, the unity of an identical I as substratum for ability-characteristics pertaining specifically to an I, for personal characteristics which are variable and in fact never resting, and which eventually, in a collapse, can change totally...<sup>18</sup>

However, all personal ability-characteristics are changeable, variable and unrestable totally. There are, among these abilities, another unities which persist; that is, the unity of mental individuality as Husserl said, "...among them are the strictly so-called character traits; the unity of mental individuality which persists even through character changes, permeates all that."<sup>19</sup> Thus, whenever psyche or psychic life is criticized deeply, it reveals the various unifications of psyche and novel principle of the unification of multiplicity which leads to gain novel sense as Husserl indicates in *Phenomenological Psychology* that the concepts: real flowing state (here lived experience streaming away), real characteristics, real process, and reality which lasts amid the causality of real alterations – these are the concepts which here gain a totally novel sense.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> **Phen. Psych.**, p. 107.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p.108.

### 2.2.2 Nature of Mental Act

In the experiential world, the connection between body and psyche leads us to both inner and external experiences.<sup>21</sup> As per psyche and the world, human being can get an act of the world of experience as Husserl said, “As a theme for psychology I have now, among other things, the acts of world-experience in which the being of the world first proves itself for me, and through which the world is there for me at all.”<sup>22</sup> The act of world-experience is psychic function as the psychic subject while it perceives the world. By the nature of psychic life or the act of world-experience of psyche, it suffices temporarily and multiplies abundantly.<sup>23</sup> Thus, the psychic act appears in several kinds; for instance, feeling sensuously, perceiving, and other forms of experiencing. Beside this, Husserl indicates that the psychic act brings out through activities such as considering together, comparing, distinguishing, exercising universalization and ideation, concluding and proving.

In addition, the act of psyche brings out in passive and active ways as he said, “...but also passively feeling joy and pain or else actively taking pleasure or displeasure in something...”<sup>24</sup> Moreover, when the target is set up by psyche itself, the psyche is directed toward the target and strives for it because the nature of the psychic act is desire and will so as to achieve these targets as Husserl said, “... instinctively striving for something or else actively setting oneself goals and being directed toward them by desiring and willing,

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<sup>21</sup> There are two kinds of the experience in which Husserl regards certainly as the real one; that is, the external experience, physical experience, as experience of material things; and inner experience or psychic experience. These experiences stand side by side. Moreover, each of these experiences is foundational for corresponding experiential sciences: The one for the sciences of material nature and the other for psychology as science of the soul. See *Ideas II*, p. 133.

<sup>22</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method*, tr. by Ronald Bruzina, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 34-35.

<sup>23</sup> *Phen. Psych.*, p. 79.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

but also achieving those goals by acting.”<sup>25</sup> Even though the psychic act appears in various manners, each of them depends on the objects outside, the activities, and the targets being set up by psyche itself.

### 2.2.3 Mental Process

According to Husserl, the object appears to mind in different ways and different modes of beings depended on the source and the level of knowledge. So, mind is not concerned with critique of knowledge, but plays intention to such the given object as it gets a function in an act of intuition and thought.<sup>26</sup> The act of intuition and thought is generated by mental lived experiences initiated by the relation of mind and the material thing as his body resulting in motivation of his activities such as thinking, considering, imaging, etc., manners that are to instinctively strive for the targeted objects. With regard to this, Husserl said that the lived experiences are in one with body in intimate ways.<sup>27</sup>

In the process of the act of intuition and thought of mind, two sides stand sides by sides: one is the mind which is said to be knowing subject and the object standing over against the knowing subject is called the known object.<sup>28</sup> The process of perception, perceiving eyes, and starts with the intensive mind over the object which is immediately standing before the eyes, then, the object is seen, and grasped. This results in live experience of mind. However, to know the object straightforwardly is to conduct a reflection on the given object; it is to notice on the multiplicity of the object constantly resulting in gaining contents of the given object obviously and fully. Anyways, the given objects can be called “fully perceived” if it is directly connected to mind. That

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<sup>25</sup> **Phen. Psych.**, p. 79.

<sup>26</sup> **IP.**, p. 13.

<sup>27</sup> **Ideas II.**, p. 129.

<sup>28</sup> *See IP.*, p. 17

is the duty of consciousness in which the intentionality leads to connect the given object. So, intentionality is said to be an essence of consciousness as Husserl said, “The essence of consciousness, in which I live as my own self, is the so-called intentionality.”<sup>29</sup> Then, it is ego functioning as self that is “I” in the perceptual process such as I see it. Then, it is mind functioning in all act of knowing as knowledge is said to be a mental experience and belongs to a knowing subject.<sup>30</sup> With regard to this point, mind enabled all act of knowledge together with intuition and thought works relatively with its factors, i.e. intentionality, reflection, consciousness and ego respectively.

### 2.2.3.1 Consciousness

In the process of perception, consciousness is one of the main factors when the given object is to be immediately perceived to mind as Husserl gives the significance of its function that consciousness is always consciousness of something.<sup>31</sup> By this point, Husserl indicates further that if the consciousness is to be acted actively, there have to be intention to an object such as hearing a tune, seeing a house, remembering a wedding, etc.<sup>32</sup> These are said to be the given object that contributes the basic act of thinking in a form of prediction and attribution, etc. on consciousness such as “is” and “is not”, “same” and “the other”. Then, the form of thought takes place in consciousness regarding the given object as it said:

“...The categorial forms that come to the fore here, that get expressed in such words as “is” and “is not”, “the same” and “the other,” “one” and “several,” “and” and “or,” in the form of predication and attribution, etc.,

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<sup>29</sup> PL., pp. 12-13.

<sup>30</sup> IP., p. 17

<sup>31</sup> PL., p. 13.

<sup>32</sup> Husserl, **On the The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time**, tr. by John Barnett Brough, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1980) p. xviii.

indicated forms of thinking by means of which thought-form that, if appropriately built up, come to consciousness on the basis of given objects synthetically connected in elementary acts so as to present states of affairs of this or that ontological form. It is also there that the “self-constitution” of specific objectivities takes place in acts of thought formed in certain ways....”<sup>33</sup>

By this passage above, it indicates the significance of consciousness which is not only consciousness of something but the act of thought when things constitute on them as a given thing. By this point, Husserl said:

“...And consciousness, in which givenness and likewise the pure act of seeing thing occur, is once again not something like a mere box in which things given simply are; rather, seeing consciousness - apart from mere attentiveness - is just acts of thought formed in certain ways, and thing, which are not acts of thought, are nonetheless constituted in them, come to givenness in them -and, as a matter of principle, show themselves to the what they are only when they are thus constituted.”<sup>34</sup>

As Husserl considerably indicates consciousness as the mental process that contributes the basic form of acts of thought, to put it more precisely about the significance of consciousness covering all its functions systematically, he distinguishes consciousness into three concepts as mentioned in his work, *Logical Investigation*, as follows:

1. Consciousness as the entire, real (reelle) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness.

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<sup>33</sup> PL., p. 52.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

2. Consciousness as the inner awareness of one's own psychic experiences.

3. Consciousness as a comprehensive designation for 'mental acts', or 'intentional experience,' of all sorts.<sup>35</sup>

In the first senses, it talks about consciousness as the real phenomenological unity of the ego's experiences. By this point, Husserl distinguishes two terms which is said to be the sources of real phenomenon of ego's experiences that is experiences and contents. Both of them, experiences and contents, get an effective function to consciousness in terms of senses; namely, percepts, imaginative and pictorial presentations, acts of conceptual thinking, surmises and doubts, joys and griefs, hopes and fears, wishes and acts of will etc.; all of these senses are said to be the experiences of consciousness.<sup>36</sup> These senses get a function thereby steaming in flux from one moment to next moment that interconnected and penetrating in manifold ways,<sup>37</sup> and have unified the stream of consciousness in the individual mind. All these are said to be the real phenomenon of empirical subject or ego as these experiences are appearing to the ego getting the function as "I" to perceive the inwardly appearing object.

### 2.2.3.2 Intentionality

Intentionality is said to be the essential factor of mental process as it directs mental process towards the intended object to mind in the process of perception resulting in perceiving the object as Husserl indicates the nature of intentionality that the essence of consciousness is intentionality.<sup>38</sup> However,

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<sup>35</sup> Husserl, **Logical Investigation**, vol. II, tr. by J. N. Findlay, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 81.

<sup>36</sup> **LI II.**, p. 82.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> **PL.**, p. xxvii.

the theory of intentionality is about an account of how acts of consciousness refer to objects that normally classified into two main categories: one is relational, and adverbial in other.<sup>39</sup> The former is about the intentionality related to two main factors of perceiving process -the act of knowing and the known objects;<sup>40</sup> it is the mental process functions to know the object outside thereby the object must actually exist and without the actually existed object, intentionality might not be activated. Precisely, this kind of intentionality is a relationship between consciousness, mental act, and the object existing actually outside. As for the latter, this intentionality stresses on power of consciousness only. In this points, adverbial categories of intentionality do not take a relation between an act of consciousness and its objects; it disconnects the objects existing actually outside of mental process. But it refers on only the property of the acts of consciousness where the objects have internally been kept. To put it precisely into his points of views, the adverbial categories hold that the acts of consciousness have it within their power to refer to objects, even if those objects do not really exist.<sup>41</sup> As for Husserl, based on two interrelations, his thought really belongs to adverbial categories as he established the theory of phenomenology the purpose of which was to find out truly absolute data thereby searching out immanent data, the so-called hyletic data.<sup>42</sup> The hyletic data appear constantly in the stream of mental process and are extremely considered as an absolute being, clear givenness and also self-givenness in the absolute sense.<sup>43</sup> By this, according to him, whatever does not exist within mental process, it is regarded as not genuine concrete part as he said:

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<sup>39</sup> **IP.**, p. 9.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p.10.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> *Hyletic* data are data of color, data of tone, data of smell, data of pain, etc. For more detail, see **Phen. Psych.** p. 128.

<sup>43</sup> **IP.**, p. 28.

...but the physical thing which it intends or supposedly perceives or remembers, etc., is, not to be found in the cogitatio itself, as a mental process; the physical thing is not to be found as a genuine (reel) concrete part (Stück), not as something which really exists within the cogitatio.<sup>44</sup>

With this, acts of knowing, according to Husserl, do not need the object appearing outside mind, but inside mind only as mind does not become intentional through an external influence, and it does not lose its intentionality if its object ceases to exist. Also, intentionality is not an external relation that is brought about when consciousness influenced by an object, but is, on the contrary, an intrinsic feature of consciousness. Thus, intentionality does not presuppose the existence of two different entities -consciousness and the objects.<sup>45</sup>

Moreover, according to Husserl, one of the essential properties of consciousness is “intensive mental process” in which something can be perceived if mind is intentionally directed towards the object. Anyways, what to be perceived by intentional mental process is not the object outside but the essence steaming along with mental process which is called by Husserl “pure essence”. In accordance with this point, it said in *Idea I* as follows:

...All mental processes having these essential properties in common are also called “intensive mental processes”...; in so far as they are consciousness of something, they are said to be “intensively referred to this something.

As a consequence, it should be well needed that here we are not speaking of a relation between some psychological occurrence – called a mental

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<sup>44</sup> IP., p. 27.

<sup>45</sup> Dan Zahavi, **Husserl's Phenomenology**, (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 21.

process – and other real factual existence – called an object – nor of a psychological connection taking place in Objective actuality between the one and other. Rather we are speaking of mental processes purely with respect to their essence, or of pure essence and of that which is “a priori included in the essences with unconditional necessity.”<sup>46</sup>

### 2.2.3.3 Reflection

One of the essential factors of mental acts which play a vital role for experiencing the objects is reflection. An act of knowing of the objects depends on such this mental act that functions to reflect the objects to mind resulting in the process of knowledge such as thinking, imaging, considering, observing, etc. Husserl emphasizes reflection for his phenomenological method for searching pure phenomenon. By this, he states of the significance of reflection as follows:

...[R]eflection is a name for acts in which the stream of mental processes, with all its manifold occurrences (mental process-moments, intentionalia) become evidentially apprehensible and analyzable. It is, as we can also say, the name of the method of consciousness leading to the cognition of any consciousness whatever. By this very method, however, it itself becomes an Object of possible studies: Reflection is also the name for kinds of mental processes which belong essentially together and is therefore the theme of a main chapter of phenomenology...<sup>47</sup>

By the passage mentioned above, it shows that, in the sphere of the act of knowing the things, reflection as one of the mental acts plays the essential roles for apprehending and analyzing things leading to cognition eventually. By the passage mentioned above, it shows that, in the sphere of the act of knowing

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<sup>46</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 73.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.

the things, reflection as one of the mental acts plays the essential roles for apprehending and analyzing things leading to cognition eventually.

More significantly, apprehending and analyzing something, the complete data of them should be clearly grasped. By this, it is also the duty of the reflective mental act that conducts constantly, or notices in other ways, on the multiplicity of the intended resulting in opening up the characteristics of the surface or of the inside of something purely as Husserl mentions:

Already the fact that I see this thing here at one time from this side, then and even in continually changing manner from another side and ever new sides, that I am continually directly noticing it, this same thing, and yet notice now these, now those characteristics of the surface, or of the inside of something that opens up, etc...<sup>48</sup>

With regard to passage mentioned above, it talks about the reflection on the actual appearing object that makes in relation between the mental act and the intended object in the beginning of experiencing the things in which the intended object is immediately diverted to mend.

Anyway, according to Husserl, there is other kind of reflection that is the reflection has the characteristic of being a modification of a consciousness in which the consciousness can effectively undergo.<sup>49</sup> Such this reflection is also the mental process functioning immanently thereby modifying immanent data steaming along with mental process resulting in changing the already given mental process. To put it more precisely in this point of views, when the really immanent data keeping in mental process are intently reflected, the really given mental process will be reflectively modified along with the immanent data. As a result, the data will be changed into the object of

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<sup>48</sup> **Phen. Psych.**, p. 128.

<sup>49</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 178.

consciousness that have already modified. with regard to this, Husserl said that any reflection is, according to its essence, the consequence of changes in attitude whereby an already given mental process or really immanent data thereof (one not modified reflectionally) undergoes a certain transmutation precisely into the mode of consciousness (or object of consciousness) reflectionally modified.<sup>50</sup> So, it is to say that reflect plays the vital role to modify the mental process.

Actually, according to Husserl, any mental process can convert to reflective modification, so, there are two kinds of mental process; one is the mental process reflectionally unmodified and other is the mental process that reflectionally modified. In the process of reflective modification of mental process, Husserl explains that we have to get back to mental processes which are absolutely unmodified reflectionally, and to the really inherent and the intensive data belonging to them.<sup>51</sup>

Though there are two kinds of the reflective mental process; one is a reflection of the intended object outside mental process; and other is a reflection of immanent essence steaming in mental process. Husserl emphasizes the reflective mental process of the immanent essence thereby seizing upon and experiencing the essence of something as he said:

“The fundamental methodological significance of the eidetic study of the reflections for phenomenology and, no less, for psychology, is shown by the fact that under reflection all modes of the seizing upon the essence of something immanent and, on the other hand, of experiencing something immanent, are included. Included therefore is, e.g., perception of something immanent which is, in fact, a reflection in so far as it presupposes a turning

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<sup>50</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 178.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

of one's regard from something else of which one was conscious to the consciousness of that something."<sup>52</sup>

#### 2.2.4 Ego

One of essential factors for generating an experience in the triatic expression ego, cogito and cogitatum is undeniably ego. Husserl, in perceiving the object, interprets ego as the pure subjectivity the function of which is as a central locus for all possible experiences being directed from all conscious acts. Ego in this point of view is said to be pure subjectivity in which Husserl considerably accepts as the term "pure subjectivity" describes some of the actual and pervasive facts of human experiences.<sup>53</sup>

However, Husserl discloses the basic feature of ego that is the passive and active senses in which ego effectively operates with both at the same time. Besides operating with both senses, ego which has a being called "being for itself" constitutes continually self for itself. It is well known as "transcendental ego".<sup>54</sup> All of these are essential factors of ego with various activities. So, if ego is to be profoundly understood, its characters and functions are to be studied deeply and systematically.

##### 2.2.4.1 Function of Ego

As far as a function of ego is really concerned, basically, it depends its senses. Ego mainly functions with its two senses: one is passive and other is active sense; each of them has different duties. The active ego is the ego operates in any senses such as attending, considering, comparing, distinguishing etc. and takes a position. As for passive ego, it is the ego in passive sense having a function as receptivity which is called ego of

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<sup>52</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 178.

<sup>53</sup> **PL.**, p. xviii.

<sup>54</sup> Transcendental ego is the ego that has being for itself. *See PL.*, p. lii.

“tendencies”. In this point, Husserl indicates the difference of both ego as follows:

Therefore, we find, as the originally and specifically subjective, the Ego in the proper sense, the Ego of “freedom,” the attending, considering, comparing, distinguishing, judging, valuing, attracted, repulsed, inclined, disinclined, desiring, and willing Ego: The Ego that in any sense is “active” and takes a position. This, however, is only one side. Opposed to the active Ego stands the passive, and the Ego is always passive at the same time whenever it is active, in the sense of being affected as possibility of its being sheer passivity. To be sure, the very sense of the expression, “receptivity,” includes a lowest level of activity even if not the genuine freedom of active position taking. The “passive” Ego (in a second sense) is then also subjective in the original sense as the Ego of “tendencies”, the Ego that experiences stimulation from things and appearances, is attracted, and simply yields to the attractive forces.<sup>55</sup>

Although ego has different senses; active and passive, it operates with both senses at the same time as its state is subjective. In accordance with the states which are mourning, cheerfulness, passive desire and renouncing, ego systematically operates passively and actively. The operative way of ego, regarding its states and comportments in both the active as well as the passive, as it is subjective, when it is touched by the object, comports over and against the object such as to react against, to revolt against, or to pull oneself together.<sup>56</sup>

However, ego can function and comport actively only in the living body in which consciousness must be there, not only the appearance of body as Husserl said;

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<sup>55</sup> *Ideas II.*, pp. 224-5.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 225.

Thus sensibility, the ego's active functioning of the living body or the bodily organs, belongs in a fundamental, essential way to all experience of bodies. It proceeds in consciousness not as a mere series of body-appearances, as if these in themselves, through themselves alone and their coalescences, were appearance of bodies; rather, they are such in consciousness only in combination with the kinesthetically functioning living body (*Leiblichkeit*), the ego functioning here in a peculiar sort of activity and habitually.<sup>57</sup>

Furthermore, ego as subjectivity which exists in the form of real and possible awareness<sup>58</sup> has their own capacities. It actively operates with its intended object in which it always refers intentional objectivity and gets stimulation from the object including its appearances. As a result, ego can get experiences of this object, focusing on this object and acts of evaluating or willing on this object. In this point of view, Husserl called the duty of ego that it persistently forms systems of intentionality and possesses systems already formed, whose indices are the objects which the ego means, thinks, values, handles imagines, or could possibly imagine, and so forth.<sup>59</sup> More interestingly, because of deeply studying how ego effectively functions, it reveals two main kinds of ego regarding to Husserl's phenomenology; that is, transcendental ego and pure ego; each of them operates differently depending on their sources.

#### 2.2.4.2 Transcendental Ego

Husserl clearly discloses the mode of being that it has its particular constitution as he said, "...Furthermore, he recognized that every mode of being, including those characterized as transcendent, has its particular

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<sup>57</sup> *Crisis*. pp. 106-107.

<sup>58</sup> *PL.*, p. 25.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

constitution.”<sup>60</sup> With this, transcendental ego is certainly included in this as it also has being which is called “being for itself” as Husserl said, “But the ego itself has being, and its being is being-for-itself.”<sup>61</sup> The mode of being-for-itself existing in ego is said to be a genesis of transcendental ego the objectivity of which is worldly objectivities. In this point, Husserl gives an essential information as the following statement:

But the ego itself has being, and its being is being for itself. Also, its being, together with all that specifically belongs to it, is constituted in the ego and continues to constitute itself for the ego. The ego’s being-for-itself is being that is in a state of continual self-constitution, which, in turn, is the foundation of all constitution of so-called transcendentals, i.e., worldly objectivities....<sup>62</sup>

To put it more precisely, with the passage mentioned above, the mode of being-for-itself existing in ego operates its function with the state of continual self-constitution. By this point, such this mode of being continually constitutes itself for ego and also is said to be the genesis of worldly objectivity for ego. So, ego in this point is called transcendental ego.<sup>63</sup>

#### 2.2.4.3 Pure Ego

In the terms of ego, Husserl interprets and accepts it as pure subjectivity as it is a central locus of all experiences coming from all conscious acts; it is said that ego functioning with mental process (cogito) as such is called pure ego. By this, pure ego has closely relation with mental process

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<sup>60</sup> PL., p. 32.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> In the terms of “Transcendence”, it is an immanent mode of being that constitutes itself within the ego. See PL. p. 32.

(cogito)<sup>64</sup> thereby living in them with various manners such as active manner, passive or spontaneous manners and comports itself receptively.<sup>65</sup> In various manners of mental process (cogito), ego lives in there as a subject of the acts and the state as Husserl states:

...referring to the Ego that has its place precisely not in Corporeality; e.g., I “think” (cogito), i.e., I perceive, I represent in whatever mode, I judge, I feel, I will, etc., and I find myself thereby as that which is one and the same in the changing of these lived experiences, as “subject” of the acts and states. (This subject has absolute individuation as the Ego of the current cogitatio, which is itself absolutely individual in itself).

In addition to this, when ego operates with cogito, it directs its regard to every cogito objectively. Husserl makes it clear in this point of views as saying, “Instead, the Ego belongs to each coming and going mental process; its ‘regard’ is directed ‘through’ each actional cogito to the objective something. This ray of regard changes from one cogito to the next, shooting forth anew with each new cogito and vanishing with it.”<sup>66</sup> To put it more precisely regard to ego with its cogito, ego directs its ray to what is object in the act. When ego directs its rays to its intended object, then, the counter rays issued from the object comes back to ego resulting in both positive and negative behaviors of the subjective ego such as attraction, reputation etc. as Husserl states:

... Of course, in a certain general sense, the Ego directs itself in every case to the Object, but I a more particular sense at times an Ego-ray, launched from the pure Ego, goes out toward the Object, and, as it were,

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<sup>64</sup> The term “*Cogito*” is interpreted by Descartes which is comprised of every “I perceive, I remember, I phantasy, I judge, I feel, I desire, I will; all these are well known as mental process. See *Ideas I*, p. 68.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 132.

counter-ray issue from the Object and come back to the Ego. This is how it is that in desire I find myself attracted by the desired Object; I am directed to it, but in such a way that I reach out toward it, without, however, attaining it in mere desire. In love I find myself inclined to the beloved, attracted by the one I love, perhaps wholly surrendered to and lost in the beloved. In hate, on the contrary, I am indeed equally directed to the hated;... Accordingly, I behave either by following up the attraction or repulsion, yielding to it, or by resisting it; at time I am in my act of behavior 'moved', at time unmoved; at time I am one who actively moves 'himself; at time one who does not move at all ...<sup>67</sup>

More significantly, pure ego has a significant manner that is unchangeable one. In the light of this point, when pure ego operates with its intended object thereby directing its ray toward the object, seemingly, the ego is always changing. Actually, according to Husserl, pure ego is unchangeable and immutable as it is as absolute selfhood and a unity which does not present itself by reflexive shift of focus that goes back to it as a center of functioning;<sup>68</sup> but it is changeable in its practices, in its activities and passivities, in its being attracted and being repulsed, etc. Naturally, pure ego in itself is immutable.<sup>69</sup>

More importantly, the ego is said to be pure ego as it has vital role for experiencing the objects that is it plays the role as a central locus of all experiences emanating from all conscious acts resulting all affects and actions, of all attention, grasping, relating, and connecting, of all theoretical, valuing, and practical position-taking, of all enjoyment and distress, of all hope and fear, of all doing and suffering, etc.<sup>70</sup> All of these acts definitely causes from the

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<sup>67</sup> **Ideas II.**, p. 104.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

twofold radiations of ego running ahead and back; from the centre outward, through the act toward its object, and again returning rays, coming from the object back toward the centre in manifold changing phenomenological characters.<sup>71</sup>

## 2.3 Mental Objects

In the process of constitutive act in terms of perception, mental act works together with its objects flowing in the streaming of mental process. However, Husserl classifies perception into one pair; one is internal, and other is external, as he said, “In philosophical diction, both pairs of terms – we usually prefer the pair of ‘internal and external perception’ – express only one pair of concepts.”<sup>72</sup> Both of these perceptions are completely different from each other; so, the factors and the conditions including the process of such these perceptions must also be different. The material is one of the factors in the perceptual process of mental process which is called the object of mind in the thinking act. The object of mind can be systematically separated into two main appearances; one is the object appearing in life-world which can be sort out as the object available in the natural world, the object created by human beings including human beings themselves.

All of these objects appear outside mind, which are called physical data; another is the object appearing in mental process which is called immanent data or called “*Hyletic data*” in other ways. There are differences between physical data and *hyletic data*. *Hyletic data* are the data of the object such as color-data, touch-data, tone-data, which are the data of sensation, on the other hand, physical data are the data appearing with physical manners such as colourlessness, roughness, etc. Therefore, if the object of mind is thoroughly

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<sup>71</sup> *Ideas II.*, p. 112.

<sup>72</sup> *LI. II.*, p. 852.

studied, it should be two kinds of them; these are: The object available in the life-world such as the object created by the nature, the object created by human beings, and human as the intersubjectivities; and other is the object streaming along the mental process which is called “immanent data” in other ways.

### 2.3.1 Objects in the Life-World

The life-world is the world where human beings live their life thereby encountering inevitably the natural thing and the social life that is pregiven in the everyday life. Whatever either created by human beings or by the nature scatters in the realm of the life-world is said to be the original self-evidence that related to human beings in their everyday life in form of perception that resulting in experiences and knowledge. Husserl explains precisely about life-world and its realm that the life-world is a realm of original self-evidence that is self-evidently given is, in perception, experienced as “the thing itself” in immediate presence, or, in memory, remembered as the thing itself; and every other manner of intuition is a presentification of the thing itself.<sup>73</sup>

The most importance of the self-evidence in the life-world is that it can reasonably lead us to intuitive knowledge as we can induce to get such this knowledge from the self-evidence by perceiving directly as Husserl says, “Every mediate cognition belonging in this sphere – broadly speaking, every manner of induction – has the sense of an induction of something intuitable, something possibly perceivably as the thing itself or rememberable as having - been-perceived, etc....”<sup>74</sup> Thus, the life-world is said to be as the quintessence of a reality that lived, experienced, and endured.<sup>75</sup> The sources of self-evidence which take place purely in the life-world and given us experiences come

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<sup>73</sup> **Crisis.**, p. 128.

<sup>74</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>75</sup> Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, **The Structures of the Life-World**, vol. 2, (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 198), p. 1.

directly from the object in the life-world that appears with various manners. As it is said that the object given in session resulting in sensory perception before entering to knowing action (thinking), the object does not appear as mere material manners but its valuable and practical appearances. In this point of views, Husserl said, “(This) world is there for me not only as a world of mere thing, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world...”<sup>76</sup> By this point, Husserl indicates the object appearing with two characteristics that draw human intention to perceive it; that is, value-characteristic and practical-characteristic. To put it more precisely about these characteristics of the object, it should mention Husserl’s word as saying:

“I simply find the physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material determinations but also with value-characteristics, as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like. Immediately, physical things stand there as Objects of use, the “table” with its “books,” the “drinking glass,” the “vase” the “piano,” etc. These value-characteristics and practical characteristics also belong constitutively to the Objects “on hand” as Objects, regardless of whether or not I turn to such characteristics and the Objects...”<sup>77</sup>

In addition to the object, human beings, brutes, animals which are available in the life-world are also treated as the object appearing surround the life-world. For human beings, they are exactly different from other objects as their appearances being recognized through their expressions in their bodylines on the basis of physical objects just as the artworks, cultural objects and also social groups are recognized in this regard.<sup>78</sup> Not merely their bodily

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<sup>76</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 53.

<sup>77</sup> **Ibid.**

<sup>78</sup> **IP.**, p. 58.

appearances do we recognize but also their value-characteristics and practical-characteristics as Husserl said, “Naturally this applies not only in the case of the “mere physical things,” but also in the case of humans and brute animals belonging to my surrounding world. They are my “friends” or “enemies,” my “servants” or “superiors,” “strangers” or “relatives,” etc.”<sup>79</sup>

Another appearances of the object, according to Husserl, are closely related to its sensible features. By this point of views, in the life-world, the object appears immediately to us by two sides which is called by Husserl as a two-sided material-mental objects; one is the material side, other as the mental side. Regardingly, whenever the object is immediately perceived, not only its physical form is perceived, but mental sense<sup>80</sup> which is expressed. Husserl makes it clear in this point of views thereby explaining as follows:

...Most of the things of our life-world, as the world which constantly surrounds us as our experiential world, can serve us as examples: desks and other furniture, houses, fields, gardens, tools, pictures, etc. They are immediately experienced by us as mentally significant things; they are not seen as merely physical, but in their sensuously experienced shape, in their spatial form and every turn of this form, and in their other sensible features, a mental sense is expressed.<sup>81</sup>

Regarding the passage mentioned above, although, the object is closely considered as two appearances of two material and mental sides, they both are reasonably experienced concretely together. To support this point, duality of the object, that is, one is expressing side, and other is expressed side is said to be its particular characteristic, but when it is to be experienced, it is

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<sup>79</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 53.

<sup>80</sup> As for the terms “mental sense”, sometime Husserl used it to describe under the title “cultural object”, see **Phen. Psych.**, p. 86.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

unitarily perceived as Husserl said that in the concrete contemplation of a work of art, as of any cultural object, of any tool, of a machine, of a building, of a speech or a text, we experienced not duality but unity, which can then only afterwards and abstractly be considered according to two sides: of that which expresses and of the expressed sense, the cultural significance.<sup>82</sup> So, the object appearing to us in the life-world is not mere with their material form but together with mentality expressed in it resulting us being impressed in it in this regard. As Husserl says, "... according to every form-element a mentality which is expressed in it, which is – literally or figuratively – uttered in it. It is not associated in a merely extrinsic fashion but is intrinsically blended in, as a sense included in it, and expressed – we might even say ‘impressed’ – in it.”<sup>83</sup>

In addition, Husserl indicates the feather of the object in the life-world that the object appears as the unity of various informations; they are fully compounded with the information such as a physical thing, property, relationship, predicatively formed affair-complex, aggregate, ordered set.<sup>84</sup> It is called by Husserl as the concept of the object in other ways. By this, Husserl remarkably classifies the concept of the object into three types, viz. logical-formal concept, regional concept, and material particularization.<sup>85</sup>

As for logical-formal concept, it is the concept related to the object, property, facts, relation, numbers, etc. and expressed the form of significations, categories of signification such as the concept and proposition in general. All

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<sup>82</sup> **Phen. Psych.**, p. 85.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 53.

<sup>85</sup> Husserl, **Phenomenology and the Foundation of the Sciences: Third Book, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy**, trs. by Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980), p. 53.

these concepts are reasonably said to be the common property of all sciences in general.<sup>86</sup>

As for the regional concepts, it is the concepts related to its region being expressed itself such as the physical thing. Besides, it expresses the logical derivations of the regions such as thing-property, thing-relation, etc. in addition to this, the concept of region still has a formal character; they permeate all sciences of a region and underlie all particular concepts.<sup>87</sup>

The last concept of the object is of the material particularization. It is about the regional concept having relationship with the materially determinate things regarding their material contents. Besides these, it contains all formal modes viz. the mode of the number belonging to arithmetic, the modes of the idea of signification belonging to the logic of signification, and the modes of spatiality belonging to the geometry. In addition to this, the character of this concept is quite different; they have different color, tone, kind of sensory feeling, derives and the like. It is said that because of these differences of the concepts, they contribute the material content to all determination.<sup>88</sup>

Conclusively in terms of the object, it is a name of various informations which are compounded together, for example, the physical thing, property, relationship, predicatively formed affair-complex, aggregate, ordered set.<sup>89</sup> All of various informations are suitably classified into three concepts, the well-known concepts of the object, as logical-formal concept, regional concept, and material particularization, they are remarkably considered as the essential sources of all sciences as they are related to what is intuited, experienced, and also formed as diagrams, models, observation, and experiences which are as of

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<sup>86</sup> **Ideas III.**, p. 84.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 20.

the form of all sciences. With this regard, Husserl said, “The concepts are again and again related to what is intuited, in the experiential science they are related to what is experienced, and conversely, under the guidance of intuition and its data, concepts are formed again and again (diagrams, models, observations, experiments).”<sup>90</sup>

Another feature of the object as a material, according to Husserl, is explained through its essential quality by using two terms; *res extensa*.<sup>91</sup> By the meaning to the terms, by the etymology, the term “res” means reality. In the proper sense, the reality is called “materiality”.<sup>92</sup> For the term “extensa”, it etymologically means extension. So, Husserl elaborates the comprehensive essential attribute of the material being with two qualities; extension and materiality as he said, “... although the fully comprehensive essential attribute of the material being is not mere extension but is instead, materiality.”<sup>93</sup> To put it more precisely in this point of views, the material being has the essential feature that is extension. Whenever it changes, always, it changes with these: individual property (the quality of being a thing), state, process, relation, complexation, etc.<sup>94</sup> Owing that the essential feature of the material thing is extension and materiality as their reality,<sup>95</sup> in the terms of extension, the material thing alters not only in magnitude but position; the alternation of the material thing can be possible both magnitude and position. In this point, Husserl elaborates as follows:

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<sup>90</sup> **Ideas III.**, pp. 83-84.

<sup>91</sup> **Ideas II.**, p. 36.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>95</sup> The material thing consists of two essential parts: one is the corporeal extension -determinations viz. thing, magnitude, form, figure and geometrical determinations; other is its real qualities viz. the modes pertaining to them in the current circumstances. *See Ibid.*, p. 33.

...Accordingly, it is not only that every alteration in magnitude, with a conservation of the same spatial form, implies an alteration of extension, and that the same is true for every alteration the form with a conservation of the magnitude and for every deformation in whatever sense, but also every alteration of positioning is an alteration of the extension.<sup>96</sup>

In the terms of materiality or the real quality of the material thing, it is not totally separated from the altered material thing; still it has fully material character that is material thingness; though, the material thing is fragmented in peace by peace as Husserl said, "...There belongs to the essence of extension the ideal possibility of fragmentation. It is then evident that every fragmentation of the extension fragments the thing itself -i.e., splits it into pieces, each of which once again has the full thingly character, that of material thingness."<sup>97</sup>

### 2.3.2 Immanent Data

Immanent data is said to be as the field of pure or transcendental phenomenology.<sup>98</sup> Immanent data are the data flowing along the streaming of consciousness as the object can be perceived in mental process only. Immanent data" are the main aim in the investigative process of pure phenomenon in phenomenology as the immanent data are extremely recognized as absolute and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense.<sup>99</sup> Besides this, such these data can be found in mental process only as Husserl said, "immanent here means then genuinely (reell) immanent in the cognitive mental process."<sup>100</sup> So, in the process of finding the pure phenomenon or immanent data, it is to

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<sup>96</sup> **Ideas II.**, p. 32.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> Husserl, **Thing and Space, Lecture of 1907**, tr. by Richard Rojcewicz, (London: Springer-Science+Business Media. B.V., 1997), p. xix.

<sup>99</sup> **IP.**, p. 28.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

concentrate on whatever flowing in mental process so as to see the absolute sense, the immanent data. By this point of views, Husserl elucidates thus:

“It is also clear that the cogitationes present a sphere of absolutely immanent data; it is in this sense that we understand “immanence.” In the “seeing” pure phenomena the object is not outside cognition or outside “consciousness,” while being given in the sense of the absolute self-givenness of something which is simply “seen”.<sup>101</sup>

To put it more precisely about the immanent data, the term “Immanent data” is sometime replaced by the term “*hyletic* data”, “sensory data” (sinnliche Daten), or, “sensation data”(Empfindungsdaten).<sup>102</sup> In *Phenomenological Psychology*, Husserl clearly discloses the *hyletic* data that these data are the data of tone, data of color, data of pain.<sup>103</sup> As the *hyletic* data being merely found in mental process as they flows under the stream of mental process, they get the function as sensuous contents of mental process thereby unifying with mental process in which mental process gets the intensive function to perceive the sensuous contents. Evidently, in this point, Husserl elucidates thus:

“All these functional characters are called intentional characters, characters of the consciousness of something; but the perceptual data which as purely subjectively given nuclear contents are matters of the modes of consciousness which transcend them, and which in their own essential

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<sup>101</sup> IP., p. 28.

<sup>102</sup> David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, **Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language**, (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1944), p. 138.

<sup>103</sup> Phen. Psych., p. 127.

content contain nothing of such character of consciousness, are called universally hyletic data.”<sup>104</sup>

*Hyletic* data are used as perceptual data for intensive mental process; it is only the data of sensation differentiated from the physical object. By this, Husserl evidently indicates the difference between the sensation data and the physical object that sensation-data are in principle completely different from colour, smoothness, shape, simpliciter, in short from all types of phases of things. Color, shape, etc., are qualities of the physical object, or “things”. But *hyle*, or sensation-data, are completely different, since they are phases of perceptual experience.<sup>105</sup>

## 2.4 Concluding Remarks

As the mental transformations are aim to inherently operate with original mental process, the main factors of such these transformation are to deal with mental process including its essential factors in which mind functioning with. Husserl, who is the founder of phenomenology, which is said to be the perceptual concept as it talks about the way in which mind perceives the object, reveals the main factors of such transformations by using the triad “ego cogito cogitatum”; all are systematically used as the main agents in perceptual process in his phenomenology. Each of them has definitely different functions but performs coordinatively. Ego has a mode of being that can have a constitution in or for self; so, it is classified as subjectivity the function of which is to be a center for all experiences emanating from conscious acts. In originating of ego’s experiences, ego operates with cogito thereby directing its

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<sup>104</sup> **Phen. Psych.**, p. 127.

<sup>105</sup> David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, **Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language**, (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1944), p. 138.

ray to its intended object. Cogito is mental process; it is mental acts such as perceiving, presenting considering, judging, willing and so on.

According to Husserl, every cogito has cogitatum. Cogitatum is classified as the object of mental process (cogita). Cogitatum (object) classified into two types; one is a physical object which is the objects available in the life-world surrounding us such as desks and other furniture, houses, fields, gardens, tools, pictures; each of them has two characteristics that are value-characteristics as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like and practical characteristics or the object of use such as the “table” with its “books,” the “drinking glass,” the “vase” the “piano,” etc. Also, human beings and brutes are considerably classified in to the object in the life-world. There is other object for mental process that is immanent data which are called “*hyletic* data”, “sensory data” (sinnliche Daten), or, “sensation data” (Empfindungsdaten). To put it more precisely, they are the data of tone, color, pain, etc.; all of these data found in the stream of mental process only. Regarding the triad, ego cogito cogitatum, which used as the main factors for inherent operative transformation of the original mental process, researcher opines that they are the genesis of experiences leading to the true knowledge as the relation of ego, cogito and cogitatum is regarded as a starting point for knowledgeable acts and also transformations of original mental process thereby operating inherently.

# **CHAPTER III**

## **SYSTEM OF IDEALLY INHERENT OPERATIVE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL MENTAL PROCESS**

### **3.1 Introduction**

Normally, when mind gets any function, it always operates with its object which is called a mental act or a mental process. In the process of transformations of the mental process, it is a process of the modification of the mental process which related to two main steps; that is, one is about the modification of the mental process in relation with a reflection in connection with all process of the modification; and other is concerned with two levels, that is, the modification of the mental process must be undergone during the original course and all different kinds of variations. All of these are called the operation of transformations of the original mental process. Moreover, there is other aspect of modifications related to the mental process while the operative transformations are still in process that is a function of the mental process which is in a flux of becoming together with its object mediated by a flowing phase such as a living now of the mental process in the contradistinction of its “before”, and “after” phases.

As for the intended object used for the modifications of the mental process, it must be the same intentional objectivities to be intended or reflected as it used for every mental process in the process of the modifications.

However, the modifications of the mental process as an operation of ideally inherent transformations of the original mental process results in various forms of a reproduction, each has its precisely corresponding and yet thoroughly modified counterpart in a recollection, likewise in a possible anticipation, in a possible mere phantasy and again, in the reiterations of such variations.<sup>1</sup>

Also, in the process of the modifications, every mental process must function in parallel with every forms of the reproduction in this regard.<sup>2</sup> So what to study in the operation of ideally inherent transformations of the original mental process is the reflection of the mental process in connection with all modification, the originary mental process in connection with all remembering, presentations in phantasy, and all various forms of reproductions.

### **3.2 Operative System of Ideally Inherent Transformations of the Original Mental Process**

Regarding the operation of the ideally inherent transformations of the original mental process, in seizing up on the essence, Husserl starts symmetrically with originally presentative perception or an external perception which is to percept the object outside and used the perceived object as the essential data, the immanent data for such these transformations of absolutely originary mental process. The reflection plays an essential role for the mental process to the cognition of any consciousness;<sup>3</sup> and considerably relate to the modifications of the mental process as the modes of seizing upon the essence of something immanent.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Husserl, **Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology**, First Book, tr. by F. Kersten, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), p. 179.

<sup>2</sup> See **Ideas I**, p. 179.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 177.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 178.

Anyways, during the process of modifications of the originary mental process, it is essentially mediated by inner time, which is called a flowing phase in other ways. Then, the operation of ideally inherent transformations of the originary mental process is in the process step by step; from the step of retention which is said to be the primary memory to the step of recollection, the second memory following by a representation the function of which is to represent new essence of the data that undergone through various forms of all modifications of the originary mental process.

### 3.2.1 External Perception

The initial sept of the modifications is certainly concerned with the originary mental process which is the perception of a physical thing of the mental process. Regardingly, the modificative process must turn back to the perceptual percept of the physical thing. In this point, Husserl said:

...Conversely, starting from any mental process already characterized as such modification, and which then in itself is always characterized as that <modification>, we are led back to certain primal mental processes, to “impressions” which absolutely originary mental processes exhibit in the phenomenological sense. Thus, perceptions of physical things are originally mental processes in relation to all rememberings, presentations, in phantasy, and so forth. They are therefore as originary as concrete mental processes can be universally. This is because they have in their concretion, more precisely considered, only one, but also always a continuously flowing, absolutely originary phase – the moment of the living now.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> **Ideas I**, p. 179.

Reregard to the passage above, it indicates the significance of the originary mental process, as it is called absolutely mental processes, in the modificative process as the immanent data used for the operation of transformations are inherently brought from the originary mental process which is the mental process in the perception of a physical thing.

Moreover, according to Husserl, the perception of any physical thing<sup>6</sup> is the originary mental process functioning in the process of modifications thereby connecting with all various forms of transformations such as remembering or retention, recollection, representation respectively and mediated by flowing phase of the mental process as the duration of any perceived objects appears also in the continues stream of consciousness. The physical perception is well-known as the external perception.

In terms of the perception, Husserl classifies it into two pairs, each of which is completely different; the first pair is an external perception and a perception of self, the second is sensuous and internal perception.<sup>7</sup> According to Husserl, the external perception is an experiencing of something itself, the physical thing itself that is that it itself is there.<sup>8</sup> However, in the perceptual circumstances, in *Logical Investigation*, Husserl prefers using only one pair of a perception that is internal and external perception as he said, “In philosophical diction, both pairs of terms – we usually prefer the pair of ‘internal and external perception’ – express only one pair of concepts.”<sup>9</sup> To put

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<sup>6</sup> Husserl explains the meaning of perception that it is psychologically speaking, the experience we have when, for example, we see a tree, “for, before our eye stands the tree” with definitely appearing sides. See Husserl, **Introduction of Logic and Theory of Knowledge**, tr. by Claire Ortiz Hill, (Dordrecht; Springer, 2008), p. 214.

<sup>7</sup> Husserl, **Logical Investigation**, vol. II, tr. J. N. Findlay, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 852.

<sup>8</sup> Husserl, **Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology**, tr. by Dorion Cairns, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 23.

<sup>9</sup> **LI. II.**, p. 853.

it more precisely about the perception, Husserl differentiates this external perception from this internal perception as saying thus:

We have originary experience of concrete physical things in “external perception,” but no longer in memory or in forward-regarding expectation; we have originary experience of ourselves and of our state of consciousness in so-called internal or self-perception; not, however, of others and of their mental process in empathy”.<sup>10</sup>

Regarding the passage above, Husserl indicates the essential manners of two perceptions differently. One is the perception of physical things which are not in the memory yet and other is the perception emphasized on the mental state.

In the process of modifications of the original mental process, Husserl emphasizes on the perception of physical things or the external perception as it is called in other ways. With this, he gives a detail of such this perception:

... (E)ternal perception as perception of mental even, for example, the caption of a red thing standing before me. This perception attributes temporality and spatiality to what is perceived, though with some indefiniteness. The thing has its spatiality that puts it in its place in space, namely points beyond itself in a spatial environment, etc. And, likewise for time. Also belonging to external perception is the fact that it is “external” that it has a relation to me and, more precisely, to my body, which is always a component of the thing-environment “co-perceived” in the thing-perception.<sup>11</sup>

Considered deeply, Husserl systematically utilizes the physical perception as an original cause of the modifications of the original mental

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<sup>10</sup> **Ideas I**, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> **ILTK**, p. 366.

process, for materials or physical things are used as the first cause of perception as Husserl said, “The originally presentive act is the material perception (perception of physical things), the perception of bodies. With this, a basic sort of that perception is designated.”<sup>12</sup> Such these materials are initially for the sensory materials of the external perception setting themselves off from the collective consciousness of mere experience, but they are not set off by adequate seeing.<sup>13</sup> Anyways, the same material is constantly used as the immanent data of consciousness.

### 3.2.2 Reflection

Husserl indicates the significance of the reflection that it always relies on the mental process and motivate this mental process to knowing act of the object thereby apprehending and analyzing the reflected object as he mentioned, “According to what has just been explained, reflection is a name for acts in which the stream of mental process, with all its manifold occurrence (mental process-moments), intentionalia) become evidentially apprehensible and analyzable.”<sup>14</sup> Besides, that reflection can gives us various kinds of any angle of the object that results in the act of intuition or the act of thinking as Husserl said:

...Whether in the act of intuiting or in the acting of thinking, in the natural mode of reflection we are turned to *the objects* as they are given to us each time and as a matter of course, even though they are given in different ways and in different modes of being, according to the sources an level of our cognition.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> **Ideas III.**, p.1.

<sup>13</sup> **ILTK.**, p. 243.

<sup>14</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 177.

<sup>15</sup> **IP.**, p. 13.

To get an experience of the object, it depends on the connection of the object and the factors of this mental process by a reflection. Without this reflection, the mental process cannot be directed towards the object, so, the object is just an object, but no perception. Husserl explains how any reflection gets an essential function for helping the mental process experiencing the object that is directness. By this point, Husserl exemplifies the house and house-perception by saying that perceiving straightforwardly, we grasp, for example, the house and not the perceiving. Only in the reflection do we directed ourselves to perceiving itself and to its perceptual directedness to the house.<sup>16</sup> Regardingly, here, it might be called the reflection of the mental process directed towards the physical object in other ways. Here is said to be acting of a reflective perception.<sup>17</sup>

However, there is the reflective mental process that functions to direct the object of consciousness to the mental process; it is called an act of a reflective imagination.<sup>18</sup> The reflective mental process in this level plays an essential role for the modificative process of consciousness. Husserl reveals that the reflection of any kind has any characteristic of being a modification of consciousness and, moreover, a modification which essentially any consciousness can undergo.<sup>19</sup> Such this reflection is said to be internal reflection in other ways. it functions to draw the object in mental process to be the intended object to the mental process and utilizes the intended object for the whole process of modifications and for various forms of transformations. By this point, Husserl makes it clear:

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<sup>16</sup> **CM.**, p. 33.

<sup>17</sup> *See IP.*, p. 24.

<sup>18</sup> *See also Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 178.

... “(I)nternal reflection” – an act of meaning immerses itself in their intentionality and thus “draw” from them the objects intended in them implicate and makes those objects into intended objects in the strict sense of objectivating positing. The act functioning as a substrate in this process can be an act that re-presents something emptily. Naturally, the memory of a joy, of a wish, and so forth, can emerge: and an act of meaning can be directed towards what was joyful, what was wished as wished, without a living representation holding sway in the act.”<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, in the process of an internal reflection, it functions as a mode of seizing up an essence of something immanent or experiencing something immanent.<sup>21</sup> By the mode of seizing up the essence, a reflection immanently directs sensuous mental process toward immanent data or sensation contents such as color-data, touch-data and tone-data, and the like,<sup>22</sup> resulting in the intensive mental process and perceiving something immanent or seizing up the essence of something immanent.

In conclusion, in terms of the reflection, it might say that it is characterized by disclosing in order to grasp something that was already given prior to that grasping. By this point, Husserl mentioned as follows:

“When I say “I”, I grasp myself in a simple reflection. But this self-experience [*selbst-erfahrung*] is like every experience [*Erfahrung*], and in particular, every perception a mere directing myself towards something that was already there for me, that was already conscious, but not thematically experience, nor notice.

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<sup>20</sup> **Ideas I**, p. 132.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>22</sup> *See Ibid.*, p. 203.

Whenever I reflect, I find myself “in relation” to something as affected or active. That to which I am related is experientially conscious – it is already there for me as a ‘lived -experience’ in order for me to be able to related myself to it”.<sup>23</sup>

### 3.2.3 Inner Time

Regarding the time related to the modification process, according to Husserl, he uses the terms “phenomenological time” and “Cosmic time” to explain the relationship between immanent essence of a concrete sensation - content and the objective spatial extension<sup>24</sup> as he stated:

Cosmic time is related to phenomenological time in a certain way analogous to the way in which a “spread” belonging to the immanent essence of a concrete sensation-content (perhaps a visual sensation-content in the field of visual sensation-Data) is related to objective spatial “extension,” namely <the “extension”> of the appearing physical Objects being visually “adumbrated” in this sensation-Datum...”<sup>25</sup>

By this passage above, mainly, Husserl needs to explain a form of the continuous consciousness of that internal time; it is the process of unifying a form of all mental process within one stream of such this mental process of pure ego. It is the function of this mental process functioning with following aspects:

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<sup>23</sup> Dan Zahavi, **Husserl’s Phenomenology**, (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 89.

<sup>24</sup> Husserl makes it clear between phenomenological time and the cosmic time; one is the time for unitary form of all mental process within one stream of mental process; one is about the modes of givenness of Now, Before, and After. *See Ideas I*, p. 192.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193.

1. The mode of givenness (the immanent essence of a concrete sensation-content such as a visual sensation-content in the field of visual Sensation-Data that is continually adumbrated from the visual physical object).

2. The temporal mental processes are to be unified as one stream of this mental process.

3. The phase or the temporal horizon which is cosmic time in other ways such as the horizon of Now, horizon of Before, and the horizon of After.<sup>26</sup>

4. Pure ego, the function of which is to direct its regards to the temporal modes of givenness (immanent essences).

Husserl clearly indicates a connectedness of these. Initially, pure ego directs its regards to temporal modes of givenness that belongs to this mental process; then, each mental process flows away with temporal extents and horizon (phases) so as to make an unity of one stream of this mental process which belongs to pure ego.<sup>27</sup>

Husserl differentiates the mental process from a stream of every mental process as he said, “Every single mental process, e.g. a mental process of joy, can begin as well as end and hence delimit its duration. But the stream of mental processes cannot begin and end.”<sup>28</sup> By this point, each mental process is temporal one; but enduring one; it has to find any place in infinite continuum of its duration; that is a fulfilled continuum. Regardingly, this mental process is to flow away to constructs the unity of a stream of such this mental process which is a infinite one and pertains to a pure ego; the purpose of which is to make up an originary horizon of this pure ego that is one pure ego

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<sup>26</sup> It is called “The three-fold Horizon of mental process”. See **Ideas I**, p. 195.

<sup>27</sup> See **CM**, p. 42.

<sup>28</sup> **Ideas I**, p. 194.

in which one stream of this mental process fulfilled with respect to all three dimensions, essentially concatenated in this fulling, summoning itself in its continuity of contents.<sup>29</sup> Husserl explicitly explains a construction of the unitary form of all mental processes within one stream of mental processes by saying:

..., I can have, first of all, in the pure regard the joy itself which begins and ends and endures in the meantime, I go along with its temporal phases. However, I can take heed of its modes of givenness: I take heed, in the particular case, of the modes of "Now" and accordingly of the fact that a new and continually new <Now> follows upon this Now and, of essential necessity, upon every <Now> in necessary continuity, of the fact that in unity therewith every actually present Now is changed into a Just Now, the Just Now once more and continuously into an always new Just Now of the Just Now; and so forth. This holds for every new ensuing Now.<sup>30</sup>

To understand the passage above, it should give more explanation about continual connection of three-fold horizon of this mental process: each Now, horizon of Before, and horizon of After, all these are said to be the phase of duration of the mental process flowing away to construct the unity of one stream of the mental process with pure ego. By this connectedness of these horizons of this mental process, for example of enduring of this mental process of the content, according to Husserl, every Now phase of this mental process has necessarily its horizon of Before. To put it more precisely by this point, the Now phase of the mental process has the significance of past Now which comprise a past something in this form; it is called a past mental process in the same way. In addition, every Now phase of the mental process has also

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<sup>29</sup> *Ideas I.*, p. 196.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 194-5.

necessary its horizon of After. When the Now phase of the mental process changes, it changes into new Now phase of mental process.<sup>31</sup>

Each phase of this mental process can be necessarily empty form without any content; otherwise, all of them will have a non-sense which cannot process into other phase. By this Husserl said, “Of necessarily there is attached to the consciousness of Now the consciousness of the just past, the consciousness of which is itself again a Now. No mental process can cease without there being consciousness of the ceasing and of the having ceased.”<sup>32</sup>

When the Now phase of this mental process is gradually ceased and changes into a newly filled out Now, all mental process unified under the one stream of this mental process which is said to be infinite unity and one pure ego as one stream of mental processes fulfilled with respect to all three dimensions or duration phases.

### 3.2.4 Retention

In the term of “memory”, it has it have various forms; each form is completely different forms of objectivity and givenness; but all interwoven with each other.<sup>33</sup> Retention is one of memories which is said to be primary memory as Husserl said, “(As before, we have immanent objects in view here, which properly speaking are not constituted in a “perception.”) Primary memory, or as we said, retention, contentiously attaches itself to the ‘impression.’”<sup>34</sup> With this, process of a modification uses immanent objects kept in this retention as an initial part of the constitution of an identical

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<sup>31</sup> For more details, see **Ideas I.**, p. 195.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>33</sup> **IP.**, p. 48.

<sup>34</sup> **PCIT.**, p. 32.

object;<sup>35</sup> the object succeeded from the externally perception still persists. In respect to this retention, it is said to be first process of a modification having the following aspects:

1. Mental process making its appearance in the primitive mode,
2. Immanent data, the data kept in memory after having perceived a physical being, and
3. Duration phase of mental process.

By the aspect mentioned above, Husserl illustrates this retention as the primary memory in the initial process of a modification as saying:

To select only one main point: Each mental process that makes its appearance in the primitive mode, immanent presentences, (and, as making its appearance thus, its itself also an objects of consciousness) is followed, with inalterable necessity, by a ‘retentional consciousness’, as an original modification by virtue of which the primitive mode, “given at present”, goes over, in a continuous synthesis, into the modified form, the Same that “just now” was. As now present, this modified conscious functions, in accordance with the same law, as the primitive mode relative to a new modification (a modification of the modification); and so on, continually.<sup>36</sup>

With respect with the passage mentioned above, immanent data are the data kept in memory which is called retention; it is relative to primitive mode of an actual mental process which perceived the physical object. The perceived object is kept in the memory which is called retention as the primary memory in the modificative process; it is modified with its phase which is

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<sup>35</sup> Husserl, **Formal and Transcendental Logic**, tr. by Dorion Cairns, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), p. 319.

<sup>36</sup> **FTL.**, p. 318.

called “just Now” as the phase of a primitive mode of the mental process is called actual Now.

To put it more precisely about the relation of this primitive mode of the mental process with its object and this retention mental process with its immanent data, Husserl elucidates as follows:

...In the case of any spatial thing, he explores its (potential and perhaps actual) changing perspectives; furthermore, with regard to its temporal modes of givenness, the modifications of this being still intended while it sinks retentionally into the past and, with respect to the Ego, the modes of his specifically one still-having and holding, the modes of attention and so forth.<sup>37</sup>

The object which is perceived as a physical being does not lost in anywhere, but it retentionally sinks into the memory used as the immanent data for further modifications.

### 3.2.5 Recollection

Of memories in modificative forms of the mental process, a recollection is immanently said to be secondary memory.<sup>38</sup> This recollection is completely distinguished from the primary memory, this is the retention as they are different forms and functions of this mental process. To understand differences of both retention and recollection, firstly, Husserl elucidates the function of them that this retention is passive that produces no enduring objectives whether in the original modification or the reproductive modification, but only holds the object perceived outwardly in the mental

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<sup>37</sup> CM., p. 48.

<sup>38</sup> Husserl, *On the The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, tr. by John Barnett Brough, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1980), p. 37.

process and stamps on it as the character of the “just past”.<sup>39</sup> On the contrary, for this recollection as the secondary memory in the modificative process of this mental process, Husserl discloses its function that it is awakening of an empty consciousness and points back to earlier original consciousness.<sup>40</sup> Beside, this recollection plays an essential role for building up a continuum of primal data and retention and also constitute an immanent enduring objectivity as Husserl said:

“On the other hand, the recollection itself is presently and originally constituted recollection and afterwards just past recollection. It itself is built up in a continuum of primal data and retentions and in union with them constitutes (or rather: reconstitutes) an immanent or transcendent enduring objectivity....”<sup>41</sup>

The more important thing to be reasonably considered is that what in recollection is. In this point, whatever is in memory which is said in other ways that whatever called a remembered is what in recollection. With regard to this, Husserl said, “..., the temporal present in recollection is a remembered, re-presented present; and the past too is a remembered, re-presented past but not an actually present pass, not a perceived past, not a past primary given and intuited.”<sup>42</sup> To put it more precisely with regard to what to be recollected, Husserl explains clearly what remembered is to be in recollection as he said thus:

In recollection, in spite the characteristic of reproduction, what is remembered stands before our eyes itself; it is not perchance something else there in person (as in the case of depicting) and of which we are conscious as

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<sup>39</sup> PCIT., p. 38.

<sup>40</sup> FTL., p. 209.

<sup>41</sup> PCIT., p. 38.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

the representant of something resembling it, of something presenting itself in it. And it also stands before our eyes in the sense of the “objectivity itself,” insofar as it is not meant through an emptiness and can first be brought close to us out of this distance in consciousness; that is, can be made intuitive.<sup>43</sup>

### 3.2.6 Representation

To understand this representation, Husserl illustrates it thereby comparing with a presentation. This representation and that presentation are quite different in terms of its phase. For the presentation, it is systematically constituted thereby using an actual present perception as the presentation based on the basis of the sensation. While the representation uses primary memory, the retention, so as to constitute a representation that is based on phantasies. Husserl said in this point of views,

“... it is natural to say at first (Brentano did) that the actually present perception becomes constituted as presentation on the basis of sensations and that primary memory becomes constituted as representation (*Repräsentation*), as re-presentation (*Vergegenwärtigung*) on the basis of phantasies.<sup>44</sup>

With this, the representation is also a modification of this mental process which is said to be successional process from primary memory, a retention, and secondary memory, a recollection as Husserl said, “The looking-toward or looking-back at what is given retentionally – and the retention itself – is then fulfilled in re-presentation proper: what is given as just having been shows itself to be identical with what is recollected.”<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> PICM., p. 604.

<sup>44</sup> PCIT., p. 37.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

Moreover, as a representation can occur independently without being jointed with any perception and have an event belonging to internal consciousness, it is said to be something free that could run free as Husserl said, “Re-presentation, on the other hand, is something free, a free running through: We can carry out the re-presentation “more quickly” or “more slowly,” more distinctly and explicitly or more confusedly, in a single lightning-like stroke or in articulated steps, and so on.”<sup>46</sup>

### **3.2.7 Linking Systems of Each Factors in the Transformative Operation of the Original Mental process**

As the process of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mind is the inherent essential modifications of the mental process, initially, it uses the perceived physical thing as essential data for all process of the transformative operation and various kinds of variations. The system of this transformative operation of its all process is performed thereby linking each other in which this mental process is used as the prime mechanics for the modification of the data. In this point, Husserl explains that it performs a function of a flux of becoming which is a continuous flow of retentions and protentions mediated by a flowing phase of originality itself in which there is consciousness of the living now of the mental process in contradistinction to its “before” and “after”.<sup>47</sup> By this, main factors of the transformations of original mental process are systematized by linking each other through all the transformative process, from the physical perception to representation of the transformed data. To put it more precisely, during the transformative process, it is constantly systematized with three links:

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<sup>46</sup> PCIT., p. 50.

<sup>47</sup> Ideas I., p. 179.

(1) Mental process functioning the outwardly physical perception as the original mental process links to a retention; it is the physical perception linked to this retention. By this process, the data used for the transformations of the original mental process is the physical thing perceived by any physical organ which is called outwardly perceived object. After having been perceived, such this object does not disappear anywhere, but recedes in remembrance and being kept in this retention.

(2) The retention as first memory links to a recollection. It is an initial step for the transformative process of this mental process thereby using the outwardly perceived object which is called “immanent data” in other ways<sup>48</sup> as primary impression. In the performative way, the primal data which are immanently reflected as intended data are modified with the mental process continually flowing away and mediated by its temporal phases such as Now phase, After phase, and Before phase respectively; then, pass over into a retention. In this link, Husserl said that it is a continuous flow of retentions and protentions mediated by a flowing phase of originality itself in which there is consciousness of living now of the mental process in contradistinction to its “before” and “after”.<sup>49</sup> Then, the data in retention will be continually passed over to that recollection.

(3) The recollection as second memory links to the representation as a preproduction. It is the transformative process succeeding from the retention which occurs after receding retention. It is said that recollection functions as building up a continuum of the primal data and the retention and recalls what remembered is Having recalled the remembered, various forms of accomplishment are reproduced as a consequence.

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<sup>48</sup> Such these data are the sensation-contents such as color-data, touch-data, tone-data, and the like; all are called *hyletic* data. See **Ideas I**, p. 203; **Phen. Psych**, p. 128.

<sup>49</sup> **Ideas I**, p. 179.

### 3.3 Concluding Remarks

As the ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process is to immanently deal with the mental process in which this mental process has constantly undergone all process of modifications thoroughly so as to produce truly novel knowledge, Husserl reveals its working system which starts with the external perception as a starting point of such these transformations and uses the perceived object kept in mind as the immanent data for all process of transformations thereby reflecting such this object to mental process. The ideally inherent operative system of the transformations constantly proceeds with two memories; a primary memory is the retention which is the process of remembrance of the object perceived by any physical organ and being kept in mind and used for the transformative process thereby recollecting it which is said to be second memory following by a representation which is the step of representance of new essence of same datum transformed throughout various forms of modifications; from the object perceived by any physical organ to the represented datum. However, all process of transformations is immanently interfered by inner time; that is the mental process functioning under its streaming thereby flowing with its object through its duration constantly. Of these, the researcher reasonably opines that this mental process gets a function as the mechanics for moving its object on through various forms of transformations; then, such this object is represented as a new essence of the datum consequently.

# **CHAPTER IV**

## **ANALYSIS OF IDEALLY INHERENT OPERATIVE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL MENTAL PROCESS**

### **4.1 Introduction**

By an analysis of ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process herein, the researcher emphasizes on texts in which the author, Husserl, authorized directly; it is textual analysis. According to him, regarding his texts, certainly, the transformations as such emphasize on a function of this mental process in the form of perceptions and experiences. By this, main factors of such this operation are mainly based on: 1) The mental process with its essential function, 2) pure ego, 3) the object or the physical being, 4) duration phase of the mental process. By this operation, Husserl makes it clear that every mental process always flows in its stream as its normal function; it flows in the stream with its contents, which is the so called immanent data, *hyletic* data, such as data of color, data of tone, data of smell, data of pain, etc.; all these data are inwardly kept in this mental process, which is called “a form of the retention”, after having been perceived by any of bodily organ outwardly. Also, all these data are essentially used as an intended content for pure ego which intentionally directs its regard toward such these data. Then, these data are further modified with the mental process continually flowing away and mediated by its temporal phase which consists of three phases such as Now phase, After phase, and Before phase respectively. Husserl explains the

connectedness of such these factors and its functions relating to each other as follows:

In itself every mental process is a flux of becoming, is what it is in a generation originaliter of an invariant essential type; it is continuous flow of retentions and protentions mediated by a flowing phase of originality itself in which there is consciousness of the living now of the mental process in contradistinction to its “before” and “after”<sup>1</sup>

By passage mentioned above, Husserl indicates a process of the transformative operation emphasized on the original mental process functioning in accordance with its essential aspects in terms of continual changing form. Besides, regarding this operation, there are various forms of reproductions resulting from the transformative operation functioning, each form has its precisely corresponding and yet thoroughly modified counter part in a recollection in mere phantasy and in the reiterations of such variation.<sup>2</sup>

What to criticize in these point of views is the process of an original mental process in connection with spatial materials in initial as its initial operation, the modifications of each mental process in each form of the reproduction of the inherent transformative operation of the mental process such as the form of a retention with its content, primary memory as it is called, the form of a retention, secondary memory, and the representation including its condition. As main aim of the operation is to unify all mental process under one stream of a mental process pertaining to a pure ego, the way to connect all form of the reproduction and unify all mental process thereof is to also be analyzed

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<sup>1</sup> Edmund Husserl, **Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology**, First Book, tr. by F. Kersten, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), p. 179.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

## 4.2 Original Mental Process and Perception of Physical Things

The original mental process is a mental process functioning of perception of a physical thing that Husserl used as the starting point for the process of the inherent transformative operation of this mental process. More significantly, he illustrates a perception of the physical thing of an original mental process closely connected with various forms of modifications that are all rememberings, presentations in phantasies, and so forth. Regarding the perception of a physical thing of an original mental process, it said that it is an external perception in other ways. In the process of physical perception, the perception can be fully accomplished with the essential factors:

1. The original mental process and pure ego,
2. Sensory organ or living body,
3. The physical things and sense contents,
4. The Reflection and intention.

With regard to this perception, the physical thing of this mental process, the physical thing which is to be perceived will be the thing with objectivity and its valuable.<sup>3</sup> With this, ego can direct its regard toward the object in as far as the object appears with a dual sense; the objectivity of the thing and valuing of the thing. Husserl explains such this essential of the object with dual senses that not merely the thing of the object we are intentionally directed out regard toward to but its values. With this, Husserl gives more detail considerable significance of the object with dual senses as saying:

In acts of the sort to which valuing acts belong, we thus have “an intentional Objects” in a dual sense: we must distinguish between the mere

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<sup>3</sup> Husserl used the terms “*dual intentio*”, a two-fold advertedness, to explain the essential manner of the object is to be perceived in a mode of actionality, see **Ideas I**, p. 77.

“thing” and the full intentional Objects: and, correspondingly, <there is> a dual intentio, a two-fold advertedness. If we are directed to a thing in an act of valuing, then our direction to the thing itself is a heeding of it, a seizing upon it; but we are “directed” – only not in the manner of seizing – also the value. Not only the objectivating of the thing but also the valuing of the thing which includes the objectivating, has the mode of actionality.<sup>4</sup>

As general object appears not merely as a thing but with its qualities such as values, etc. In an act of valuing of the object, we are directed to the valued; in an act of gladness, to the gladsome; in an act of loving, to the loved; all of these can be called “sense contents”<sup>5</sup> in other ways. Be sure, when we are turned valuingly to a thing, we seize upon not merely a thing, but rather its valuable thing or value.<sup>6</sup>

There is other essential aspect that can turn ego to the object; that is, a reflection. With regard to this reflection, it is one of essential factors for knowing act of the object thoroughly as it functions for noticing on the multicuity of the object resulting in opening up all angle of the object. Husserl demonstrates the way to reflective conduct thereby observing the object covering all its appearances and contents thoroughly:

“I see thing here at one from this side, then and even in continually changing manner from other side and ever new sides, that I am continually directly noticing it, this same thing and yet notice now these, now those

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<sup>4</sup> **Ideas I.**, p. 77.

<sup>5</sup> Sense-contents are the data which are the primary one such as the data of colour, touch and sound. The qualities of the object such as the qualities of its colour, its roughness, etc., are the phases of the object which are revealed through sense-contents. Besides, Sense-contents are the layer which gives meaning and the material for the formation of meaning at different levels. For more details, see Mrinal Kanti Bhadra, **A Critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism**, (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1990), pp. 66-67.

<sup>6</sup> See **Ideas I.**, pp. 76-77.

chrematistics of the surface, or of the inside of something that opens up etc.”<sup>7</sup>

So, it is to say that by only a reflection we can immediately direct a regard toward the multiplicity of the object and that results in an act of intuition or in an act of thinking consequently.

In perceiving the object, it is to perceive straightforwardly as the object given directly as Husserl said, “In perception the perceived thing is believed to be directly given. Before my perceiving eyes stands the thing. I see it, and I grasp it.”<sup>8</sup> As for a connection of sense organs and sense objects in the process of experiences or perception, each of living organ perceives the object in different ways as each of organ has different functions. Husserl elucidates the process of perception by saying: “In seeing, the eyes are directed upon the seen and run over its edges, surfaces, etc. When it touches objects, the hand slides over them. Moving myself, I bring my ear closer in order to hear.”<sup>9</sup> All of these perceptions is to perceive the object by any living organ such as eyes perceiving the object by seeing the object with its contents, the hand perceiving the object by touching the object; ears perceiving the object by hearing the sound, etc. Regardingly, possibilities of this physical perception depends on the components such as its qualities, relationships, changes, and its interaction of the perceiving objects.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Husserl, **Phenomenological Psychology**, tr. by John Scanlon, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1925), p. 116.

<sup>8</sup> Husserl, **The Idea of Phenomenology**, tr. by Lee Hardy, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1990), pp. 15-16.

<sup>9</sup> Husserl, **Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution**, Second Book, trs. by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), p. 61.

<sup>10</sup> Husserl, **Logical Investigation**, vol. II, tr. J. N. Findlay, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 852.

After perceiving something external; for instances, a tone, a color or the contents such as a tone-unity, a color-unity, a tactile compel, which might be called “sensuous contents” in other ways, normally, it endures or changes in its duration as Husserl said:

...In the case of the perception of a physical thing, we also include in perception the continuous perceptual appearance, the continuity of now-appearances of the physical thing, apart from retentional and protentional interweavings. The physical-thing appearance, the “thing in its orientation,” into its determinate presentation, and so on, is something enduring, just as much as the thing that appears, taken simply, is something enduring. Even the plain surface that merely appears is something that endures and changes in this duration.<sup>11</sup>

Regarding the passage above, indeed, it indicates the significance of the physical object which is outwardly perceived continually relates to temporal phase of this mental process in which the mental process flows under its stream and is permeated by a fact that the mental process related itself to its object. Husserl precisely explains an essential relation between this mental process and its object that it is the essential characteristic of every act of this mental process.<sup>12</sup> In the modificative process, such as this perception with its enduring and changing has its modification with in other forms of experiences; first it modifies in a retention, which is called first memory, the second is in recollection, the second memory, and also in varying forms of expectations.<sup>13</sup> Regardingly, sensuous contents perceived by any living organ do not disappear anywhere, but it is kept in a memory which is called “retention”. Husserl

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<sup>11</sup> Husserl, **On the The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time**, tr. by John Barnett Brough, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1980), p. 100.

<sup>12</sup> Husserl, **The Paris Lectures**, tr.&intr. Peter Koestenbaum, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), p. 18.

<sup>13</sup> **Phen. Psych.**, p. 153.

proves in this point of views by demonstrating the perceived tone as follows thus:

We now exclude all transcendent apprehension and positing and take the tone purely as a hyletic datum. It begins and ends; and after it has ended, its whole duration-unity, the unity of the whole process in which it begins and ends, “recedes” into the ever more distant past. In this sinking back, I still “hold onto it,” have it in a “retention.”<sup>14</sup>

The passage mentioned above shows also the significance of keeping process of the object in the memory in which a perceived tone is continually changing with its duration phase of time until the end of whole unity of its duration and kept in retention for being transferred constantly in other forms of modifications.

### **4.3 A Succession of the Perception to Retention**

In the modificative process, indeed, a memory plays the most important role for keeping contents in which the contents as such used as an evident, which is called “Phantasy” for reproductive process in various forms of modifications in this regard. Besides, in the modificative process of this mental process, a memory is used together with the time phase of the object in which both of them are absolutely considered as a turning point for the reproduction. Also, according to Husserl, every memory is repeatable experiences that understood as the experiences of the same object in every same duration. However, in the sphere of immanence in which its contents used as for modifications, it is memories of the past and the future of which are remembered in relation to the actual present. Husserl makes it clear in this

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<sup>14</sup> PCIT., p. 25.

point of this relation of the past and the present that the object perceived immanently used as enduring into the present by saying:

Memories in the immanent sphere can only be memories of the past and the future. It belongs to the essence of memory that what is remembered has a location in relation to the actual present. Something immanent that is simultaneous with the present is itself actually present, is immanently perceived. In the transcendent sphere, there are memories of the present, though think to the fact that a memory of the past furnished an object in to the manner in which it was experienced in a past time. This object is posited as enduring into the present....<sup>15</sup>

Regarding memories, the memory in which an evidence kept immanently and used as a starting point for information of the mental process is called primary memory or retention in other ways.<sup>16</sup> However, the information as such has continually a succession by both perceptions. First, it is a physical thing perceived as an external perception as Husserl said that perception in the case of consciousness of an external object can denote the external appearance as an immanent object.<sup>17</sup>

However, with regard to the external perception, Husserl puts three aspects of them respectively:

1. The appearance of something external;
2. The constituting consciousness in which the appearance of something external becomes constitutes as something immanent;

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<sup>15</sup> Husserl, **Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory**, tr. by John B. Brough, (The Netherlands: Springer, 2005), p. 636.

<sup>16</sup> Husserl, **The Idea of Phenomenology**, tr. by Lee Hardy, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1990), p. 49.

<sup>17</sup> **PCIT**, p. 100.

3. The turning-towards, which can just as well be a turning towards the appearance and its components as towards what appears.<sup>18</sup>

Secondary, it is an inner perception which is said to be the perception of an imminent object. In case of the succession of the inner perception to retention, it is to gather what immanent is together in its continuity in the now-point. However, Husserl precisely illustrates a significance of the inner perception, the information of which is used for retentional constitution:

1. the internal consciousness of the unitary immanent object, consciousness that is on hand even without turning towards the object, namely, as the consciousness that constitutes what is in time; either

2. the consciousness of something internal together with our turning towards it.<sup>19</sup>

By the external perception succeeding to a retention, the first memory, a temporal object can be continually succeeded to this retention as they are not merely unities in time but contain a temporal extension in themselves. By this, Husserl gives more detail so as to clearly understand by showing the example of the tone that when a tone sounds, my objectivating apprehension can make the tone itself, which endures and fades away, into an object and yet not make the duration of the tone or the tone in its duration into an object. The later – the tone in its duration – is a temporal object.<sup>20</sup> With this, the temporal tone appears and endures and fades away; then, it makes its duration, an extension of the tone. So, each tone has its temporal extension itself; for example, the first tone sounds, then comes the second tone, then the third and so on.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> PCIT., pp. 100-101.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

In the process of changing of the physical objects, it is related to the temporal phase of the mental process that is from Now phase to ever new Now phase respectively. As for this, Husserl gives the example of the hearing sound by saying;

... “When it begins to sound, it hears it as now; but while it continues to sound it has an ever new now, and the now that immediately preceded it changes into a past. Therefore, at any given time I hear only the actually present phase of the tone, and the objectivity of the whole enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum that is in part memory, in smallest punctual part perception, and in further part expectation...”<sup>22</sup>

By the passage mentioned above, the object continually changes their duration of Now phase to ever Now phase. This signifies that tone continually changes; it changes with its duration phase. When the tone is presently heard, it said to be Now phase of the tone. After hearing, the tone recedes into memory, it is said to be the new Now phase of the tone. Evidently, this signifies that it is to constitute an act-continuum in memory in this regard.

By constituting the immanent temporal object to retention, it inherently dials with the immanent objects, which take the tone purely as a hyletic datum. Husserl uses primary impression<sup>23</sup> as the source points as the beginning. The primary impression derives from the continual flow of hyletic data, the flow of which Husserl explains with showing an example of the tone thus:

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<sup>22</sup> PCIT., p. 25.

<sup>23</sup> The terms “*primal impression*” is the technical terms used by Husserl so as to explain the operates with a moment of the concrete act that is narrowly directed toward the now-phase of the object. See Dan Zahavi, **Husserl’s Phenomenology**, (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 83.

We now exclude all transcendent apprehension and positing and take the tone purely as a hyletic datum. It begins and ends; and after it has ended. Its whole duration-unity, the unity of the whole process in which it begins and ends, “recedes” into the ever more distant past. In this sinking back, I still “hold on to it,” have it in a “retention.” And as long as the retention lasts, the tone has its own temporality; it is the same, its duration is the same. I can direct my attention to the way in which it is given. I am conscious of the tone *ad* of the duration it fills in a continuity of “modes,” in a “continual flow.” And one points, one phase of this flow is called “consciousness of the commencing tone”; and in this phase I am conscious of the first time-tone of the tone’s duration in the mode of the now.<sup>24</sup>

The passage above exposes a source of the primary impression which is immanently used as beginning points as a now point in which the tone is given that it is perceived as now. To put more precisely in this point of views, it is consciousness in a state of constant change; it is the tone-now present “in person” that continuously changes in something that has been: an always new tone-now continuously relieves the one that has passed over into modification.<sup>25</sup> Here come to the primal impression, the consciousness of the tone-now passes over into a retention. Then, this retention itself has in turn become a now tone; it is something actually existing.<sup>26</sup>

As the mental process being in state of constant change, the tone become a now tone which it is actually present, it is said to be retention of the tone that has been. It is to say that each retention is a continuum and each of them changes in succession from each other; each early is a retention for every later point. With this, Husserl illustrates by exemplifying the tone that tone

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<sup>24</sup> **PCIT.**, p. 25.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>26</sup> *See also, Ibid.*

begins and “it” steadily continues. The tone-now changes into a tone-having been; the impressional consciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new retentional consciousness.<sup>27</sup>

Even though, there are retentions succeeding from other retention which is called series of a retention, as each retention is a continuum, a continuous series of them pertaining to the beginning point that is primary impression. Moreover, as each point of this retention succeeds to other, each earlier point of this series is adumbrated in its turns as a now in the sense of this retention. Thus, it is said that the continuity of this retentional modification attaches itself to each of these retentions and this continuity itself is again an actually present point that is retentionally adumbrated.<sup>28</sup>

It is to say that by a continuity of this retentional modification, it has twofold kinds:<sup>29</sup>

1. The first continuity emphasizes that the running off modes of an immanent temporal object have a binging, a source-point, so to speak. It is running-off mode with which the immanent object begins to exist.

2. The second continuity is obviously included in the first, the continuity of running-off mode of the object’s duration. It is the running-off continuity of enduring that a continuum whose phases are the continua of the running-off mode belonging to the different time-points of the duration of the object.


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<sup>27</sup> PCIT., p. 25.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 30.


To make it clear about this, Husserl explains through diagram as shows:



A E – The series of now point

A Á – Sinking into the past

E Á – Continuum of phase (Now-point with horizon of the past)



A E → - The series of nows perhaps filled with other objects.

Regarding this diagram, the continuous series of the ordained illustrates the running-off modes of an enduring object. They grow from A (one point) into a determinate extent, which has the last now as its final point. Then, the series of running-off modes that no longer include a now (that is, a now belonging to this duration) begins; the duration is no longer actually present but

past, and continuously sinking deeper into past. This diagram therefor gives a complete picture of the double continuity of running-off modes.<sup>30</sup>

#### 4.4 Modification of Recollection (The Second Memory)

By the tone receded into deeper memory, if it is to be directed to a process of the perception in the present time again, it must be recalled as main aspect of the recollective process is to uncover the past that Husserl said, “In the most original manner conceivable it uncovers my own past by means of recollections.”<sup>31</sup> More significantly, to put it more precisely about recollection, it could be interpreted in this ways:

It is a “reproduction” that confers on what is reproduced the original characteristic of givenness once again, of what is remembered; and this characteristic is the characteristic of something that has been actual. The actuality is a modification of the perceptually constituted actuality taken simply or of present actuality. More precisely, this “having been actual” is not a simple, fulfilled having been actual that is the correlate of retention, but a mediate mode of having been actual pointing back intentionally to a continuous sequence of memories that terminates in the retentional field of actual perception and that – in the case of the realization of these memories – would be fulfilled in that field.<sup>32</sup>

Recollection is said to be a secondary memory which proceeds after a primary memory, the retention, is already done. In this point, Husserl said:

“We characterized primary memory or retention as a comet’s tail that attaches itself to the perception of the moment. Secondary momentary,

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<sup>30</sup> See also **PCIT.**, p. 30.

<sup>31</sup> Husserl, **Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology**, tr. by Dorion Cairns, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p.102.

<sup>32</sup> See **PICM.**, p. 603.

recollection, must be distinguished absolutely from primary memory or retention. After the primary memory is over with, a new memory of this motion, of that melody, can emerge retention.”<sup>33</sup>

Retention and Recollection are totally different in the terms of duration phases and functions; though, both of them function in relation with each other as they are in memory. Husserl considerably differentiates a retention from a recollection that a retention is something intuition of something absent; something which is not actually exist but has just existed and receded in past; by contrast, recollection is a re-presenting (*vergegenwärtigende*) intentional act directed toward a completed past occurrence.<sup>34</sup>

More significantly, in connection with this recollection, Husserl elucidates main purpose of this recollection of the object receded in past that it is to aim a perception of the temporal object as the original perception of same object in its presence is.<sup>35</sup> However, as the object to be perfectly recalled is a remembered and re-presented present and a remembered and re-presented past, Husserl classifies the recollections into two levels:<sup>36</sup>

1. It is the presently and originally constituted recollection,
2. It is just past recollection.

In the process of such this recollective modification of the mental process, there are three essential aspects that a recollection built on:<sup>37</sup>

1. A continuum of primal data,
2. A continuum of retentions,

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<sup>33</sup> PCIT., p. 37.

<sup>34</sup> See Dan Zahavi, **Husserl's Phenomenology**, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 83.

<sup>35</sup> PICM., p. 670.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>37</sup> PCIT., p. 38

3. A union with them constitutes (or rather: reconstitutes) an immanent or transcendent enduring objectivity (depending on whether the recollection is directed towards something immanent or towards something transcendent).

In the process of a recollective modification, the reproduction of a temporal object (second memory), Husserl explains thereby showing some case of the melody we recall that we recently heard at a concert. The process of such this recollection of this melody is not different from a perception in general. With this, to recall perfectly and accurately, the whole memory phenomenon and the perception of this melody should have exactly same constitution that is the point of a now-point of the perception corresponds a now-point of the memory. By this, we run through the melody in phantasy; we hear, as it were, the initial tone, then the second, and so on respectively. The preceding tone is still kept in consciousness and then there is always the tone of a now-point at particular time. It said that primary memory (retention)<sup>38</sup> of the tone that, as it were, I have just heard and expectation (protention) of the tone that are yet to come fuse with the apprehension of the tone that is now appearing and that as it were, I am now hearing.<sup>39</sup> Then, the melody is re-presented (recalled). Anyways, the now-points once again has a temporal fringe for consciousness for a continuity of memorial apprehension. However, continually, when the re-presented melody has finally run its course, a retention attaches itself to the quasi-hearing. Then, what is quasi-heard continue to fade away; no longer to hear as the re-presented melody let to run its course tone by tone in memory or phantasy.

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<sup>38</sup> As for the term of “Retention”, it produces no enduring objectivities (either originally or reproductively) but only holds in consciousness what has been produced and stamps on it the character of the “just past”. See *PCIT.*, p. 38.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

Anyways, there are two phases of the melody. First is the actually hearing of the melody. In this case, the melody itself as a temporal object is perceived; it is called the present melody as Husserl said, “We do actually hear, the temporal object itself is perceived, the melody itself is the object of perception.”<sup>40</sup> The second one is a just past melody. As of this, it is about the melody died away, and no longer being perceived as present; but it is still kept in consciousness as Husserl also said, “After the melody has died away, we no longer have it perceived as present, but we do still have it in consciousness. It is not a present melody, but a one just past.”<sup>41</sup> Regardingly, in a recollection, Husserl makes it clear about a kind of the temporal phase of this recollection as saying thus, “...the temporal present in recollection is a remembered, re-presented present; and the past too is a remembered, re-presented past but not an actually present past, not a perceived past, not a past primarily given and intuited.”<sup>42</sup>

#### **4.5 Reproduction’s Mode of the Accomplishment**

The succeeding process from recollection or re-presentation of the modification of the mental process is a reproductive mode. Having recalled the remembered, re-presented present and past of melody, it said that the recollection such as can considerably establish various forms of accomplishment; one is the reproduction of a flash and other is afresh reproduction depending on its condition. In this point, Husserl explicitly illustrates different modes of an accomplished re-presentation or recollection as saying thus:

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<sup>40</sup> PCIT., p. 38.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

Now recollection can occur in different forms of accomplishment. Either we execute it in a simple grasping, as when a memory “rises to the surface” and we look at what is remembered in a flash. In this case what is remembered is vague; perhaps the memory brings forward, intuitively, a privileged momentary phase, but it does not repeat its object. Or we execute a memory that tactually does reproduce and repeat, a memory in which the temporal object is completely built up afresh in continuum of representations and in which we perceive it again, as it were – but only “as it were”.<sup>43</sup>

Regarding the message mentioned above, a re-presentation of the tone has produced two kinds of accomplishments; each of them makes a strong effect to further perception. The former reproduced tone is to look a flash and grasp the remembered tone soon it arises to the surface without repeating its objects. As a consequence, the reproduced tone turns to be vague in this regard. And the reproduced tone as such cannot be perceived resulting in not even constituting in primary memory or retention. By contrast, the latter, after having accomplished recollective modification, repeats and reproduces a memory, the remembered tone, so that the object is completely built up afresh in the continuum and also is perceived again consequently.

Although, the re-presentation or the recollection has recalled the remembered tone as its object with two forms of accomplishment, it is the whole process of the re-presentational modification of such this perceptual process. More significantly, the re-presentative process is to recall what is given as just having been or what is given retentionally, so, it must be identical with what is recollected. Regardingly, Husserl said, “The looking-toward or looking-back at what is given retentionally – and the retention itself

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<sup>43</sup> PCIT., p. 38.

– is then fulfilled in re-presentation proper: what is given as just having been shows itself to be identical with what is recollected.”<sup>44</sup>

## 4.6 Conditions of Reproductive Modification

The modification of this mental process in the operation of ideally inherent transformations of the original mental process is to usually deal with the mental process that is related various kinds of factors. Regarding the modification, initially, it starts with the original mental process in which the perception of a physical thing as its primal impression in actually perception relates to inherently mental act such as all rememberings, presentations, in phantasy and so on. So, in the term of a perception in the mental process, it is separately divided into two sides; one is a physical perception which is the perception related to a physical thing outwardly; other is an inner perception which is the perception dealing with the mental process and its immanent data only. So, the reproductive modification is conditioned under both processes of a physical perception and an immanent perception in this regard.

By the condition of the perception of a physical thing, the sensuous contents are to be fully perceived depending on two conditions:

1. The condition of the constitution of an intuited thing,
2. The change of a body and the change in things.

By the condition of a constitution of the intuited things, it is immediately concerned with same unchanged objects appearance, but the circumstances changes in this way now, and now in other ways. It is about the relation of the perceived object and illuminating circumstances. Although, the object has the same and one form, maintaining one identical form, it appears with different colors while appearing under an illuminating body; its color

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<sup>44</sup> PCIT., p. 39.

appearance does not accurate with its real color appearance. By the contrary, the color appearance of the object turns to be normal if it is normally seen in the sunlight on the clear sky without the influence of the other bodies which might affect the color-appearance. Possibly, according to Husserl, a normal color of the object can keep changing depending on its circumstances; for example, on the clear light or hazy, etc. Regardingly, the normal circumstances can turn to be normal resulting in normal re-appearance of the object. In this point, Husserl said, “Yet it is inherent in the thing that its normal color keeps changing, precisely in dependence on whatever illumination bodies are involved, whether the day is one of clear light or is hazy, etc., and it is only with the return of the normal circumstances that the normal color re-appears.”<sup>45</sup>

By changing the body and changing in the thing, it is relation between a body and a thing in the perception; for example, seeing immediately or seeing without any mediating thing. By this seeing, it will produce the normal experiences as perceiving the world as it originally constitutes. But if a foreign medium is interposed between eyes and the thing seen. The thing seen through the foreign medium appears same, but the appearance of the seen thing does not accurate with the seen as it is, it is just an appearance of a phantom. In this point, Husserl explains thereby showing an example of wearing eyeglasses by saying:

Only the “mode of appearance “of the thing (in this case, the appearance of the phantom) depends on whether this or that medium is mediating between the eye and the thing. Transparent glass is indeed a medium that can be seen through, but it changes the images of things in different ways

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<sup>45</sup> **Ideas II.**, p. 64.

according to its different curvatures, and, if it is colored, it transmits its color to them – all that belongs in the realm of experience.<sup>46</sup>

Also, there is other points that would be a condition that is a case of an abnormal change of an organ itself.<sup>47</sup> In the case of touching, if the object is touched by a finger with a blister or a braded hand, it differently affects to the tactual properties that all tactual properties of the thing are given differently. Also, in the case of crossing eyes or fingers, the things of sight or things of touch will be two different senses. In addition, with regard to an abnormality of any living body concerning with consuming, especially about medicine. Definitely, some kind of medicines can make a strong effect to body after consuming. This point, Husserl precisely illustrates by exemplifying the *santonin*.<sup>48</sup> Because of the influence of *santonin*, it can change an appearance of the world which is the alteration of world's colors as Husserl said, "If I ingest *santonin*, then the whole world "seems" to change; e.t., it "alters" its color. The "alteration" is a "seeming."<sup>49</sup>

All of these conditions related to a connection between any living organ and any thinghood in the circumstances of experiences could bring a false on experiencers in which the change of an appearance is a uniform one for all the things, recognizable as a uniform change according to types.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, the changes arising from uncertainties of the thinghood and

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<sup>46</sup> **Ideas II.**, p. 65.

<sup>47</sup> In terms of "Abnormal organ", it loses its normal psychophysical conditionality together with its normal form, and all things are perceived by such an organ appearing in another aspect, not normal ones. *See Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>48</sup> *Santonin* is a white crystalline substance having a bitter taste, extracted from the buds of *levant*, *wormseed* and used as an *anthelmintic*. It occasions a peculiar temporary color blindness, causing object to appear as if seen through a yellow glass. *Santonin* is *Anthelmintic* isolated from the dried unexpanded flower heads of *Artemisia maritime* and other species of *Artemisia* found principally in Russian and Chinese *Turkestan* and the Southern *Ural* region. *See* <http://www.definition-of.net/santonin>.

<sup>49</sup> **Ideas II.**, p. 67.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

abnormalities of the organ result in an abnormal system of experiences and an error perception eventually. Regardingly, when the original mental process perceived the false information, the information from the physical perception as an initial point of the operation of ideally inherent transformations of the original mental process could not accurate with the real information and leads to a false reproduction consequently.

Besides, whether or not the transformed data used as the represented are accurate in original data and in the level of more or less clear fashion, partly, they immanently depend on a duration of the inherent transformative operation which is systematically related to such these main factors; mental process with its immanent contents and temporal phases. With the transformative operation, mind operates in a mode of streaming thereby flowing away with its immanent contents through temporal phases; this is the consecutive process of the flowing modifications from this retention to that representation, which is called a flow of an experience. In this regard, the represented data might not be accurate with the original data or might be in the level of more or less clear fashion. Husserl explains an effect of the consecutive-flowing modifications to the represented object as saying, “In the case of the original givenness of a temporal object, we also found that the object at first appears clearly and vitally and then with diminishing clarity passes over into emptiness. These modifications belong to the flow.”<sup>51</sup> With this, according to Husserl, the mode of an accuracy, a clarity, or an obscurity of the represented data depends on an actual experience of representing, not on what is re-presented as he said that the specific modes of the re-presentation’s vividness and lack of vividness, of its clarity and obscurity belongs to the actual experiences of representing, not to what is re-presented, or do not belong

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<sup>51</sup> **Ideas II.**, p. 50.

to it only by virtue of the specific way in which the particular re-presentation intends its object.<sup>52</sup> To put it more precisely in this point, the modes of the representation's vividness and lack of vividness, of its clarity and obscurity, as the reproduction is to bring a past temporal flow to a presentation, depend on the determinate order in which the present event can deviate from those past events. As a result, the error can occur to the reproduced data as Husserl said:

But apart from this succession, which evidently belongs to the reproduction insofar as it is a flow of experience, the reproduction brings a past temporal flow to presentation. And it is indeed possible not only that the individual steps of the memorially present event deviate from those of the past event (the steps belonging to the latter did not ensue in the way in which they are now re-presented), but also that the actual order of succession was other than what the memorial order now takes it to have been. Errors are therefore possible here; specifically, errors that derive from reproduction as reproduction ...<sup>53</sup>

Consequently, as a result from the message mentioned above, the reality and the personal apprehension of the reproduced do not correspond each other and can be false eventually.

## 4.7 Concluding Remarks


The ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process, according to Husserl, are the process dealing with mental process thereby using the object perceived by any physical organ as the data for the modificative operation and has undergone various forms of modifications such as a retention, a recollection and a representation respectively. According to Husserl, the new essence of the datum can considerably be reproduced as

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<sup>52</sup> *Ideas II.*, pp. 50-51.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

whether vague or as it were depending on how to grasp the remembered datum when a memory of the datum arises to the surface; the reproduced datum turns vague because of looking at the datum a flash without repeating it, but turn as it were because of repeating it. The researcher quite agrees with these points. As soon as the memory arises to the surface, an execution is taken on such this memory by grasping the remembered in a sudden without any careful consideration, the new essence of the datum will exactly be vague. Moreover, the remembered thing might be reproduced more or less clear depending on the primary perception of the physical object or the immanent datum flowing under the stream of mental process in the transformative; both of them is clear or not.



## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS**

Edmund Husserl accepts the reality of mental process only and tries to investigate the functioning system of mental process including its fundamental structures and the data streaming in such mental process; this is called “an investigation of pure phenomenon”. The investigation of pure phenomenon is to observe an ideally inherent operation of transformations of the original mental process in which the mental process is constantly modified with various forms of reproductions

#### **5.1 Result of the Research**

To investigate the mental process is quite complicated as it functions with various aspects and completed systems. As Husserl forthrightly guarantees that the rational knowledge can find from pure phenomenon that is to immanently find out whatever flowing under a stream of the mental process. So, he tries to find out the way to a systematical function of the mental process that flows away with its contents called immanent data, which is called pure data. So, to investigate the mental process is to observe the way in which the mental process operates transformation inherently thereby modifying itself with its data.

After having studied analytically, it found that, in the ideally inherent operative transformations of the original mental process, it is the process of unifying a form of all mental process within one stream of the mental process of pure ego. it is the function of all mental process functioning with the following aspects:

1. The mode of givenness (an immanent essence of concrete sensation-contents such as a visual sensation-content in the field of visual),
2. Sensation-Data that is continually adumbrated from the visual physical object,
3. the temporal mental processes are to be unified as one stream of all mental process,
4. the phase or the temporal horizon which is a cosmic time in other ways such as horizon of Now, horizon of Before, and horizon of After, and
5. pure ego, the function of which is to direct its regards to the temporal modes of givenness (immanent essences).

All of these aspects operate thereby succeeding from the initials.

In the process of such this operation, it has modified various forms of a reproduction such as a retention, a recollection, etc., it starts with an initial mental process of the physical perception which is called the original mental process succeeding to an immanent perception in which sensuous data are continually used as the succeeding data to a mere mental process as they are kept in the mental process; it is called the modification of a retention, which is called the first memory. By this modification, the mental process changes with its contents and temporal phases from Now phase of the contents to the new Now phase.

With succeeding from the retention, here comes the second memory which is called the modification of a recollection. It is a modificative process of the mental process being continually operated thereby succeeding from the retentional modification. It is to recall the contents receded in the past as being kept in a memory so as to perceive it again as a now phase of the contents for the new experiences.

After accomplishment of recollection fully, now, the contents of the mental process is reproduced. It reproduces with various forms of reproductions:

1. A flash reproduction,
2. An afresh reproduction.

By the flash reproduction, what remembered which is reproduced is vague as it is without repeating what reproduced is as looking a remembered arising to the surface quickly. So, it is called the vague reproduction. By the afresh reproduction, it is to reproduce the remembered together with repeating what remembered in which the object can be completely built up afresh and taken in a continuum of the representation that it is again perceived. However, a reproduction of the remembered can be full accomplished depending on the conditions as follows:

1) The condition of the perception of a physical thing, in which the sensuous contents are to be fully perceived depending on two conditions:

- The condition of the constitution of an intuited thing; it is the condition of a constitution of the intuited things that is immediately concerned with the same unchanged objects appearance, but the circumstances change in this way now, and now in other way;

- The change of body and change in things; it is relation between a body and a thing in perception; for example, seeing immediately or seeing without any mediating things or not. If with a mediate thing, it might be error perception.

2) Another condition might negatively affect to the reproductive process that is the level of either clarity or obscurity of whole object that is represented and its mode of the mental process as the mental process constantly

flowing away with its contents and temporal phases might produce either clarity or obscurity of the object.

## **5.2 Suggestions for Further Doing a Research**

In the ideally inherent operation of transformations of the original mental process, mainly, it emphasizes on mental process being transformed with its immanent data only; although, the sensuous data from physical perception are initially used as the base for an operation. In this research, it is emphasized on the connectedness of each mental process in which each mental process is constantly transformed with its contents till its contents are accomplishedly reproduced.

However, there are still some interested points for doing further a research related to the ideally inherent transformative operation of the original mental process. So, the interesting points are as follows:

1. Study of the turning points of sensuous data to immanent data,
2. Study of the difference of an external perception and an internal perception in phenomenology,
3. Mental process in the perceptual circumstances,
4. The way to reach pure phenomenon, and
5. To develop the reproduced contents for novel knowledge.

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